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You(Tube), Me, and Content ID
PAVING THE WAY FOR COMPULSORY
SYNCHRONIZATION LICENSING ON USER-
GENERATED CONTENT PLATFORMS
INTRODUCTION
Ever wonder about how the law regulates your cousin’s
wedding video posted on her YouTube account? Most
consumers do not ponder questions such as “Who owns the
content in my video?” or “What is a fair use?” or “Did I obtain
the proper permission to use Bruno Mars’s latest single as the
backing track to my video?” These are important questions of
law that are answered each day on YouTube1 by a system
called Content ID.2 Content ID identifies uses of audio and
visual works uploaded to YouTube3 and allows rights holders to
collect advertising revenue on that content through the
YouTube Partner Program.4 It is easy to see why Content ID
was implemented—300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube
per minute.5 Over six billion hours of video are watched each
month on YouTube (almost an hour for every person on earth),6
and it is unquestionably the most popular streaming video site
on the Internet.7 Because of the staggering amount of content
1 See A Guide to YouTube Removals, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals [http://perma.cc/
BF4Y-PW6E] (last visited June 6, 2016).
2 How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2797370?hl=en [http://perma.cc/QF35-F64J] (last visited June 6, 2016).
3 Id.
4 YouTube Partner Program Overview, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/72851?hl=en [http://perma.cc/U42N-3XH5] (last visited June 6, 2016).




7 Top 15 Most Popular Video Websites, December 2015, EBIZMBA,
http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/video-websites [http://perma.cc/5HZP-57DC] (last visited
June 6, 2016). According to sproutsocial, a management and engagement platform for social
business, “YouTube is without a doubt the highest-trafficked web-based video publishing
platform.” Kevin King, Vimeo Vs. YouTube: Which Is Best for Business?, SPROUTSOCIAL
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available on YouTube, an automated system such as Content
ID is necessary to help manage content owners’ rights.
Music rights holders in particular have benefitted
greatly from YouTube’s monetization of content through
advertising.8 YouTube is the world’s largest streaming music
service.9 To date, over $1 billion has been paid to owners of
sound recordings and musical compositions.10 All major record
companies and music publishers—from Universal, to Sony, to
Warner—are YouTube partners and utilize the Content ID
system to generate advertising revenue.11 This revenue pool
has increased over the years and will continue to expand as
YouTube grows, providing a much-needed boon to a sinking
music industry.12
This revenue pool is also unique because it is largely
derived from the unlicensed use of sound recordings and music
compositions.13 To pair a copyrighted recording or song with a
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://sproutsocial.com/insights/youtube-vs-vimeo-business/ [http://
perma.cc/8DXE-U8X6].
8 See Steve Knopper, YouTube’s Billion-Dollar Payout Provides New Revenue
for Musicians, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/
youtubes-billion-dollar-payout-provide-new-revenue-for-musicians-20140205 [http://perma.
cc/EB8W-JGKK].
9 See Stuart Dredge, YouTube Reveals $1bn Music Payouts, but Some Labels
Still Unhappy, THEGUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/feb/03/youtube-reveals-1bn-music-payouts-but-some-labels-still-unhappy
[http://perma.cc/M7BP-2ZCP] (“A recent piece of research by VideoInk and video analytics
firm Tubular Labs claimed that music videos account for 38.4% of all views on YouTube,
reinforcing the Google subsidiary’s position as the world’s biggest streaming music
service.”); The YouTube Musiconomy: Just How Big Is It? (Infographic), VIDEOINK (Dec. 17,
2013), http://www.thevideoink.com/features/special-issue/the-youtube-musiconomy-just
-how-big-is-it-infographic/#.VCq_CyldXA7 [http://perma.cc/G574-ERSG] (“Five of the top 10
trending videos on YouTube for 2013 were music videos . . . .”).
10 Statistics, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html
[http://perma.cc/S5FX-ZTEM] (last visited June 6, 2016); Knopper, supra note 8.
11 See Michelle Jaworski, YouTube’s Content ID Now Flagging Music in the
Public Domain, DAILY DOT (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.dailydot.com/business/youtube-
content-id-public-domain-silent-night/ [http://perma.cc/7KE2-DNQ3] (mentioning that
a user video was flagged by BMG, Warner/Chappell, and Universal Music Publishing
Group, and that these companies receive all ad revenue from flagged videos).
12 In fact, in 2014, streaming royalties made up for the current decline in
digital downloads. Hannah Karp, Spotify Royalty Payments Outpace iTunes in Some
Markets, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/
11/04/spotify-royalty-payments-outpace-itunes-in-some-markets/ [http://perma.cc/5UU
U-7EE4]; cf. Paul Resnikoff, Streaming Isn’t Saving the Music Industry After All, Data
Shows . . . , DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 26, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2014/06/26/streaming-isnt-saving-music-industry-new-data-shows [http://perma.
cc/TE2L-CLAM] (showing that streaming revenues for ad-supported, on-demand
streaming are increasing at a healthy pace, reflecting one of the few areas of growth in
the music industry).
13 See generally Bryan E. Arsham, Monetizing Infringement: A New Legal
Regime for Hosts of User-Generated Content, 101 GEO. L.J. 775 (2013) (describing how
monetizing infringing/unlicensed content is a new paradigm for copyright owners).
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visual image, users must obtain permission from the copyright
owner of the underlying musical composition and/or the sound
recording (depending upon whether one or both are being used)
by securing a synchronization, “synch,” or “sync” license.14 One
secures these rights from a record label (usually the owner of
the sound recording) and/or a music publisher15 (usually the
owner of the underlying musical composition).16 This process is
cumbersome,17 confusing,18 and oftentimes expensive.19 Thus,
most users upload videos without obtaining licenses, thereby
committing infringement.20 Rights holders, however, derive
14 Types of Copyright, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing/entry/types_of_
copyrights [http://perma.cc/K2CA-HPQG] (last visited June 6, 2016) (“Music Publishers
issue licenses . . . granting the right to synchronize the musical composition in timed
relation with audio-visual images on film or videotape.” (emphasis added)); Common
Music Licensing Terms, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/termsdefined.aspx
[http://perma.cc/5AYX-W2Y5] (last visited June 6, 2016); License Your Music, CD BABY,
http://members.cdbaby.com/license-your-music.aspx [http://perma.cc/VQC2-49J2] (last
visited June 6, 2016).
15 How to Acquire Music for Films, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/music-
career/articles-advice/film-tv/How-To-Acquire-Music-For-Films.aspx [http://perma.cc/P
TT9-9F6A] (last visited June 6, 2016); see BMI, supra note 14.
16 Generally, sync rights only refer to securing use of the musical composition
from the music publishers, while master use rights are used to refer to securing use of
the master recording from the record label, and thus, each of these rights must be
obtained separately. See Obtain a SESAC License, SESAC, http://www.sesac.com/
Licensing/obtainlicense.aspx [http://perma.cc/3AYJ-ULTM] (last visited June 6, 2016);
Heather McDonald, Master License, ABOUT CAREERS, http://musicians.about.com/
od/ip/g/masterlicense.htm [http://perma.cc/7MJG-SAYX] (last visited June 6, 2016);
Heather McDonald, Sync License, ABOUT CAREERS, http://musicians.about.com/
od/qz/g/synclicensing.htm [http://perma.cc/2ZE6-47ZN] (last visited June 6, 2016);
ASCAP, supra note 15. For the sake of simplicity, however, this note may use the term
“sync” rights throughout to mean both securing the right to use a musical composition
and the right to use a sound recording.
17 See Christiane Cargill Kinney, Posting Cover Songs on YouTube: Music
Licensing Law Explained, DIY MUSICIAN BLOG (Mar. 28, 2012), http://diymusician.cdbaby.
com/youtube/on-posting-cover-songs-on-youtube-music-licensing-law-explained/ [http://
perma.cc/N8SQ-JTJ3] (describing the complicated web of rights under the copyright act, as
well as the variety of licenses that must be obtained to properly license a cover song for a
YouTube video). See generally Solveig Whittle, How to License a Cover Song for a Music
Video, HYPEBOT (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2013/02/how-to-license-a-
cover-song-for-a-music-video.html [http://perma.cc/6ETB-TEMK] (describing the multistep
process of obtaining a mechanical license and a sync license).
18 Andy Baio, Criminal Creativity: Untangling Cover Song Licensing on
YouTube, WIRED (May 2, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/05/opinion-baio-
criminal-creativity/ [http://perma.cc/E8N7-9MNY] (mentioning that there is much
conflicting information on the Internet as to how a song is licensed for a YouTube cover
video); see Kinney, supra note 17 (“[T]his topic touches on an extremely common
misconception that I frequently run across . . . .”).
19 Money for Your Music: The Cold Hard Facts About Music Licensing, MUSICBIZ
ACADEMY, http://www.musicbizacademy.com/articles/gman_money.htm [http://perma.cc
/5KWV-9NNL] (last updated Apr. 2010) (one experienced music supervisor has synched
thousands of songs over the years and has charged anywhere from $1 to $250,000 per use).
20 See Kinney, supra note 17 (“So, you didn’t get your synch license. What
happens now? Well, we’ve all seen tons of examples that suggest that doing cover songs
is largely tolerated on YouTube.” (emphasis added)).
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online streaming revenue chiefly from these unlicensed uses by
“claiming”21 and “monetizing” these videos.22 Every day, rights
holders ratify these unlicensed uses by allowing otherwise
infringing content to remain on YouTube.23 In other words,
users can post any music they want without first obtaining a
license, so long as the content owner opts in to Content ID
monetization (and most have).24 In practical effect, Content ID
has created a de facto compulsory sync licensing regime.25
For illustrative purposes, consider the Bruno Mars
wedding video example above. Your cousin uploads the video
with a Bruno Mars recording as the backing track without
obtaining permission from the record label (to use the sound
recording) or music publisher (to use the underlying composition).
Your cousin then receives a small copyright notice, and a week
later, ads appear on the video. This means that the publisher(s)
and label(s) that own the song and sound recording claimed and
monetized the video with the help of Content ID, and your cousin
gets to keep her video up as if she had secured a license in the first
place. In essence, she is granted a compulsory sync license.
This note proposes that Congress should amend the
Copyright Act to create a compulsory sync license and require the
use of a Content ID–like system across user-generated content
21 What Is a Content ID Claim?, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/6013276?hl=en [http://perma.cc/8UNK-V7KX] (last visited June 6, 2016).
22 See Video Monetization Criteria, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/97527?hl=en [http://perma.cc/W2TA-GBFN] (last visited June 6, 2016).
Monetizing one’s video means that “YouTube may display ads served via the AdSense
auction as well as ads sold on a reservation basis via DoubleClick (DCLK) and other
YouTube-sold sources.” How Ads Are Chosen, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/94523?hl=en [http://perma.cc/QMH9-D3QG] (last visited June 6, 2016).
23 Interview with Brandon Martinez, CEO and Co-Founder, INDmusic, in New
York, New York (Oct. 31, 2014) (on file with author). INDmusic is a digital video startup
that operates one of the most active and successful multichannel networks for music on
YouTube. They first gained notoriety when they were responsible for monetizing all
“Harlem Shake” content on YouTube—one of the fiercest viral Internet sensations of this
decade. Andrew Hampp, ‘Harlem Shake’: The Making and Monetizing of the Latest
YouTube Dance Craze, BILLBOARDBIZ (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/branding/1539260/harlem-shake-the-making-and-monetizing-of-the-latest-
youtube [http://perma.cc/U8K5-MS2K].
24 See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
25 A compulsory license
provides a third party with the right to use copyrighted works without the
copyright owner’s permission so long as an established royalty fee is paid for such
use. Also known as statutory licensing, compulsory licensing is primarily utilized
in situations where high transaction costs prevent beneficial negotiations and
agreements from taking place.
Neil S. Tyler, Music Piracy and Diminishing Revenues: How Compulsory Licensing for
Interactive Webcasters Can Lead the Recording Industry Back to Prominence, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 2101, 2105 n.16 (2013).
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(UGC) platforms26 to issue these otherwise de facto compulsory
sync licenses. This would improve users’ experiences, reduce
market transaction costs, grant higher royalty splits to artists on
YouTube, increase First Amendment protections for web-based
content, and improve overall access to content. Additionally, it
would enable copyright owners to better manage their content,
since Content ID–like systems would be mandated across the
web. It would also represent a natural evolution of copyright law
by responding to advancements in content management
technology, distribution, and consumption. Content ID has
revolutionized the licensing, management, aggregation, and
organization of copyrighted works and presents an excellent
model for reforming the copyright licensing system.27 If the
technology is available, and a de facto compulsory licensing
regime already exists by virtue of Content ID, why not
extrapolate this model across the Internet to facilitate better
licensing practices?
Part I of this note describes the YouTube Content ID
system and its background, structure, inner workings, and flaws.
For purposes of this note, Content ID serves as a case study that
exemplifies the issues that arise on UGC platforms generally.
Part II discusses the genesis of compulsory licensing in the
United States, especially under section 115 of the Copyright Act,28
and describes its interaction with UGC platforms. Part III
explains why amending the Copyright Act to create a compulsory
sync license for UGC platforms is the natural evolution of
compulsory licensing and is necessary to establish a functional
ecosystem of copyright licensing on the Internet. It also describes
how a compulsory regime would solve various issues that exist
under the current framework, including by reducing Content ID
errors, improving user experience, and reducing transaction costs.
Part IV explains some of the issues inherent in the implementation
26 For the sake of clarity, this scheme would only apply to UGC platforms. User-
generated content is “any digital content that is produced and shared by end users of an
online service or website. This includes any content that is shared or produced by users that
are members or subscribers of the service, but it is not produced by the website or service
itself.” UGC includes anything from status updates/tweets, to blogs, to images/videos. User-
Generated Content (UGC), TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/3138/user-
generated-content-ugc [http://perma.cc/8NZ4-LHM9] (last visited June 6, 2016). Thus, it
follows that UGC platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, are websites or
applications that thrive mainly on content uploaded by users. See id.
27 For a fantastic discussion about central copyright clearinghouse licensing
generally, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTK
Chapter6.pdf [http://perma.cc/WG98-T4XX].
28 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
1280 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
of the proposed compulsory licensing system. This note concludes
by highlighting that the benefits of a compulsory system far
outweigh any costs and calling on Congress to take action and
amend the Copyright Act to reflect the otherwise de facto
compulsory synchronization license.
I. THE YOUTUBE CONTENT ID SYSTEM
A. Overview
YouTube’s Content ID is the system that allows copyright
holders to manage their rights on YouTube.29 First, vetted content
owners30 sign up with YouTube and upload large catalogues of
their copyrighted content, most commonly audio and visual files.31
These audio and visual files are known as “reference files.”32
When users upload videos to YouTube, the videos are scanned
against the reference files to ascertain whether there is a match.33
If either the audio or visual fingerprint of the reference file
matches the uploaded content, Content ID claims the user-
uploaded video on behalf of the rights holder, and the claim
appears in the rights holder’s Content ID account dashboard.34
Upon viewing the claim, the content owner usually has the
option to “block, monetize, or track” the video.35 These options are
known as match policies, and if the content holder has already set
29 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. Content ID is unique to YouTube,
although there are other comparable systems that have been launched on other UGC
sites. See Mike Masnick, Vimeo Pressured into Setting Up Its Own Content ID,
TECHDIRT (May 22, 2014, 12:59 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140522/0619
3627322/vimeo-pressured-into-setting-up-its-own-content-id.shtml [http://perma.cc/XY
72-CY7E]; Michael McWhertor, Twitch Implements YouTube-Like System for Blocking
Copyrighted Audio, POLYGON (Aug. 6, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://www.polygon.com/
2014/8/6/5976565/twitch-music-content-id-dmca [http://perma.cc/E8EX-9ZEP]. Vimeo
and Twitch are just two examples of a UGC platform adopting this technology.
Facebook and SoundCloud both have similar systems as well. Interview with Brandon
Martinez, supra note 23.
30 “Content owner,” “rights holder,” and “copyright owner” are terms used
interchangeably throughout this note. They are one and the same for purposes of
Content ID.
31 Katherine Oyama, Why the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Is Working Just
Fine . . . , DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2014/04/10/dmcaworkingjustfine [http://perma.cc/JV7N-7KWW]; Interview with
Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
32 See How Content ID Works, supra note 2.
33 Id.
34 Carlos Pacheco, YouTube Content ID Handbook—Google, SLIDESHARE
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.slideshare.net/carlospacheco74/you-tube-content-id-handbook
[http://perma.cc/2UZ5-2T26].
35 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
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a policy for a specific piece of content, these policies are applied
automatically when a claim is generated.36
Performing a block on a video makes the video unavailable
for viewing in the territories in which the content owner asserts
his rights,37 but the video remains viewable in other territories
(unless a rights holder who implements a block asserts worldwide
rights, which would then result in a “takedown”).38 Blocking does
not permanently delete the video from YouTube’s databases; it
simply makes it unavailable for viewing.39
Monetizing means the video will play with advertisements,
but only in the territories in which the content owner is asserting
its rights.40 When the video is selected for monetization, it becomes
available to advertisers as inventory.41 The inventory (i.e., each
piece of content) is priced at a certain rate and is usually sold in
an advertising auction.42 The ads then appear in or around the
content, and the advertiser usually pays YouTube based upon the
number of impressions the piece of content generates.43 The
revenue is then split between the rights holder(s) and YouTube,44
and the user usually does not receive any of the monies associated
with the video.45 If there is a dispute as to who owns the copyright
of the claimed content, or if YouTube cannot identify all the
copyright owners, YouTube will hold all advertising revenue in
escrow until the dispute is resolved.46 To be clear, monetization,
just like blocking, only puts advertisements on the user’s video in
territories in which the content owner is asserting its rights.47
Finally, tracking a video allows the video to remain
viewable on YouTube, which only tracks viewership and other
statistics and does not assign ads to the video.48 Most content
36 Id.
37 This is as opposed to the territories where the content owner has the rights.
38 Pacheco, supra note 34.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
42 Id.
43 Id. “Impressions” means the number of times an advertisement is shown. See
Impressions: Definition, ADWORDS, https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/6320?hl=en
[http://perma.cc/2XCM-J7YW] (last visited June 6, 2016). Ads do not appear every time the
video is watched. Thus, “views” would be an inaccurate measure to determine payment.
“Views” simply means the number of times a video is watched, regardless of whether an
impression was made. See Nick Faber, Advertising Glossary: Pageviews vs Impressions,
BLOGADS (Dec. 12, 2011), http://web.blogads.com/blog/2011/12/12/advertising-glossary-
pageviews-vs-impressions/#axzz3zD5ucRtj [http://perma.cc/R6GA-GHHW].
44 For a breakdown of the revenue allocation, see infra Section I.D.
45 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
46 Id.
47 Pacheco, supra note 34.
48 Id.
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owners prefer not to track and will instead take the proactive
approach of either monetizing or blocking a piece of content,
simply because tracking really does not benefit content owners.49
If there is an infringing piece of content not being monetized, it
should be blocked, if for no other reason than because it results in
missed revenue opportunities by diverting engagement away from
monetized content.50
Once a policy is applied, the uploader will receive a
notification that the video has been claimed, and the uploader
has to acknowledge whether they agree with the claim. If they
do not, they may dispute the claim, in which case the claim is
put on hold pending further review. The content owner has 30
days to manually review the claim.51
There is a fourth, typically nonautomated52 option available
to rights holders: performing a takedown53 under the Digital
49 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
50 Id.
51 Pacheco, supra note 34; see YouTube’s Joke of a Fair-Use Appeal Process, JWZ,
http://www.jwz.org/blog/2014/10/youtubes-joke-of-a-fair-use-appeal-process/ [http://perma.cc/
RB7Z-W9GW] (last visited June 6, 2016).
52 See Stephen McArthur, How to Beat a YouTube ContentID Copyright Claim—
What Every Gamer and MCN Should Know, GAMASUTRA (June 24, 2014, 4:41 PM),
http://gamasutra.com/blogs/StephenMcArthur/20140624/219589/How_to_Beat_a_YouTube_
ContentID_Copyright_Claim__What_every_Gamer_and_MCN_Should_Know.php [http://
perma.cc/2P8R-NEPM] (“[T]akedown notices cannot be automated.”). But seeMike Masnick,
EFF Argues That Automated Bogus DMCA Takedowns Violate the Law and Are Subject to
Sanctions, TECHDIRT (Mar. 8, 2012, 2:08 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20120308/03505018034/eff-argues-that-automated-bogus-dmca-takedowns-violate-law-are-
subject-to-sanctions.shtml [http://perma.cc/4ZTD-3ZN8] (describing automatic takedowns as
“pretty typical”). For purposes of this note, I will assume that takedowns are performed
manually because companies wish to avoid liability for automatic and recklessly submitted
takedown notices. SeeMcArthur, supra; Masnick, supra. I will also assume most takedowns
are performed manually in the wake of Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., a recent Ninth
Circuit decision holding that copyright owners must consider fair use before submitting a
takedown notice. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016). More
specifically, the court reiterated a prior holding that a copyright owner must form a
“subjective good faith belief” that a use is unauthorized before submitting a takedown. Id. at
1153. Further, the court issued an amended opinion where
it removed nearly two pages of its original opinion, including its statement that “a
copyright holder’s consideration of fair use need not be searching or intensive,”
and dicta that “the implementation of computer algorithms appears to be a valid
and good faith middle ground for processing a plethora of content while still
meeting the DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use.”
Vivian Cheng & Kristen McCallion, Ninth Circuit Issues Amended Opinion in “Dancing
Baby” DMCA Notice-and-Takedown Case, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ninth-circuit-issues-amended-opinion-in-90660/ [http://
perma.cc/FYP5-6CW6]. The court’s conscious decision to remove this language effectively
extinguishes the viability of any automatic takedown system. It shows that the court is
skeptical about the ability of computers to perform a good faith fair use analysis or complete
a searching/intensive inquiry.
53 Pacheco, supra note 34.
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Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).54 The DMCA provides a
“notice-and-takedown” process by which rights holders can
request removal of content from a service provider.55 Choosing to
perform a takedown is a legal action that sends the uploader a
DMCA notice stating that the content owner believes a piece of
content to be infringing.56 If the uploader takes no further action,
such as filing a counter notice, the uploader is issued a copyright
strike to her account.57 If an uploader receives three copyright
strikes, her account will be deactivated.58 A takedown will result
in a video being removed from all of YouTube, regardless of the
jurisdiction in which the owner is asserting her rights.59
Content ID’s powerful technology can generate partial
matches of uploaded content that is as short as a few seconds.60
The program is also versatile because if a content owner has
provided a reference file that contains portions of public domain
material or content licensed from another rights holder, Content
ID’s filters can be adjusted to claim only the original content in
that reference file.61 Further, Content ID can generate separate
matches for multiple content holders based on who has rights to
54 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 104A, 108, 112, 114, 117, 512, 701, 1201-1205, 1301-
1332, 4001 (2012).
55 Ken Liu, The DMCA Takedown Notice Demystified, SFWA,
http://www.sfwa.org/2013/03/the-dmca-takedown-notice-demystified/ [http://perma.cc/QKU6
-5R7X] (last visited June 6, 2016). A service provider is defined by the DMCA as “a provider
of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(1)(b). This is quite an expansive definition that encompasses traditional websites
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, as well as newer apps such as Snapchat.
Furthermore, a service provider must act expeditiously to remove access to allegedly
infringing material, or may face liability. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
56 Pacheco, supra note 34. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (listing the
elements of an effective DMCA notification). A takedown notice is submitted under
penalty of perjury and can expose a content owner to civil liability if submitted
frivolously. See McArthur, supra note 52.
57 Id.
58 Copyright Strike Basics, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2814000?hl=en [http://perma.cc/7UWG-LWS2] (last visited June 6, 2016).
59 Pacheco, supra note 34.
60 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23. See generally McArthur,
supra note 52. A copyright claim on any tiny portion of a gamer’s video threatens the entire
video. It does not matter that the flagged, copyrighted content is only a few seconds of a long
video. For example, TotalBiscuit (a popular game reviewer and Let’s Player) uploaded a
three-hour video that included a one minute trailer from a Nintendo Pokémon game, and
the entire video could not be monetized because of that one minute of copyrighted content.
Id.; Stephen Totilo, YouTube Pulls Official The Last of Us Trailer Due to ‘Copyright Claim,’
KOTAKU (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:08 PM), http://kotaku.com/5867852/youtube-pulls-official-the-last-
of-us-trailer-due-to-copyright-claim [http://perma.cc/C9KZ-LQW2].
61 For example, if Lil Wayne legally samples an Al Green recording on one of his
tracks, and a user uploads a video with the Lil Wayne track, Content ID will not generate a
copyright claim on behalf of Al Green for the use of his master recording because Lil Wayne
has already licensed the Al Green master. Rather, it will only generate a claim on behalf of
Lil Wayne.
1284 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
specific portions of the uploaded content (whether it be the audio
or the visual). YouTube does not tolerate abuse of the Content
ID system to make frivolous infringement claims.62 There are
strict guidelines in place for content owners that use Content ID,
and “[c]ontent owners who repeatedly make erroneous claims
can have their Content ID access disabled and their partnership
with YouTube terminated.”63 Content ID access is not to be
taken lightly.
Not everyone who is a content owner qualifies for
Content ID. Those approved to use Content ID “must own
exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is
frequently uploaded by the YouTube user community.”64 For
example, corporations like Universal and Sony, as well as huge
content aggregators ranging from Viacom to Telemundo, are
approved to use Content ID. Practically any entity that has a
“substantial body” of content will qualify for and utilize Content
ID.65 Someone with one or two channels would not qualify, as
they would lack a substantial body of original material
frequently uploaded to YouTube.
B. Reasons for Content ID’s Implementation
Multiple factors influenced the development of Content
ID. The most important was likely section 512 of the DMCA,66
which created a “safe harbor”67 from liability for online service
providers that host user-generated content if they comply with
special “notice and takedown provisions.”68 The exact provision
that YouTube follows in order to avoid infringement liability is
section 512(c), entitled “Information Residing on Systems or
62 SeeMcArthur, supra note 52.
63 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. In fact, YouTube has reaffirmed their
staunch commitment to ensure that Content ID is not abused by recently announcing “that
it would pay the legal bills of certain users who are hit with frivolous Digital Millennium
Copyright Act takedown requests for videos that are clearly protected by the fair use
doctrine.” Bill Donahue, YouTube Will Defend Users Against Unfair DMCA Takedowns,
LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://www.law360.com/media/articles/729422?
nl_pk=9c836e32-5578-4c4b-966f-f32310a54235&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=em
ail&utm_campaign=media [http://perma.cc/Q45W-PWRN].
64 How Content ID Works, supra note 2.
65 Id.
66 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
67 DMCA Safe Harbor, LUMEN, https://www.lumendatabase.org/topics/14
[http://perma.cc/9YWK-P2ZN] (last visited June 6, 2016).
68 The Notice and Take Down Provisions of the DMCA, IVANHOFFMAN,
http://www.ivanhoffman.com/dmca.html [http://perma.cc/98U7-NVGX] (last visited
June 6, 2016).
2016] YOU(TUBE), ME, AND CONTENT ID 1285
Networks At Direction of Users.”69 This provision requires that
“upon notification of claimed infringement . . . , [the service
provider] responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.”70 Section 512(c) also requires that a service
provider designate an agent to receive notifications of claimed
infringement71 and comply with discrete elements of the
notification, which must be a written communication embodying,
among other things, a statement that the content owner possesses
a good faith belief that its content is being infringed.72 Content
ID’s system is robust and possesses the infrastructure to handle
these notices in order to comply with section 512(c).
Content ID was also intended to placate disgruntled
content owners who, notwithstanding the DMCA’s framework,
had difficulty managing their content and believed YouTube was
committing copyright infringement despite its apparent compliance
with the DMCA. A mid-2000s showdown between YouTube and
Viacom, a huge content aggregator, is what some believe may have
pushed YouTube to develop Content ID.73 The case settled, but its
effects on the UGC landscape have been everlasting.
C. Content Owners Prefer Monetization over Takedowns
Content providers monetize far more than they perform
takedowns or blocks for a variety of reasons. First, monetization
is preferred because takedowns must be done manually, while
69 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
70 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
71 Id. § 512(c)(2).
72 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A). The elements of the notification are:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of
the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed . . . . (iii) Identification of
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing
activity . . . and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider
to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to contact the complaining party. . . . (v) A statement that the
complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
Id.
73 See Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software to Ease Licensing Fights,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2007, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB11816
1295626932114?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB11
8161295626932114.html [http://perma.cc/8NN6-7FPL].
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monetization can be automatic. The DMCA takedown framework
puts the onus on copyright holders to patrol their content on user-
generated content platforms, and there is no duty for service
providers to seek out infringing content.74 Although Content ID is
immensely helpful because it automatically recognizes instances
of infringement, DMCA takedowns must nonetheless be done
manually by a human sitting at a computer—a highly cumbersome
process when one is dealing with a seemingly unlimited amount of
content.75 Unlike takedowns, Content ID can instantly monetize
videos after they are claimed and immediately accumulate
revenue for rights holders.76
Second, monetization is preferable to takedowns because
users will repost infringing content no matter what. Many users
find ways to shirk the Content ID technology, such as creating
mirror images of visuals or changing the musical key of an audio
clip so that it passes through the filters undetected.77 It is likely
that in many scenarios, in the time it takes to perform a
takedown, the content has been reposted numerous times.78
Endless resources are needed to carry out a “whack-a-mole”
strategy to counteract this problem, and most copyright holders
embrace monetization instead.
Another reason why monetization is preferred is because
performing takedowns on user videos creates bad publicity for
music artists, as well as content owners in general.79 Fans
naturally do not like it when their cover of their favorite artist is
removed permanently from YouTube. Many fans are laypeople
who do not understand why they cannot use or access certain
74 SeeMasnick, supra note 29.
75 See Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Fun with YouTube’s Audio Content ID System, SCOTT SMITELLI (Apr.
19, 2009), http://www.scottsmitelli.com/articles/youtube-audio-content-id [http://perma.cc/
7E46-GZXB] (modifying a copyrighted audio file, including through pitch alteration, time
alteration, time chunks, resampling, and adding noise, to see whether Content ID’s filters
detected the recording);My Parody and How to Avoid YouTube Content ID Detection, PAUL
NABIL MATTHIS (May 21, 2014), http://paulmatthis.com/blog/my-parody-and-how-to-avoid-
youtube-content-id-detection [http://perma.cc/LL39-6PTA].
78 Stephen Carlisle, Copyright Blog Update: Meet the New and Improved
“WhackAMole,” NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIV. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/
blog-update-whack-a-mole/ [http://perma.cc/53GL-EWGN].
79 Compare Timothy Geigner, Sega Goes Nuclear on YouTube Videos of Old
Shining Force Game, TECHDIRT (Dec. 7, 2012, 7:32 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20121206/17321021296/sega-goes-nuclear-youtube-videos-old-shining-force-game.shtml
[http://perma.cc/SH8V-9A2R] (discussing Sega fans’ annoyance with excessive takedowns of
gaming clips), with Jacqui Cheng, Musician Angry After BPI Forces YouTube to Pull His
Video, ARSTECHNICA (July 23, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/business/2009/07/musician-has-
strong-words-after-youtube-video-takedown/ [http://perma.cc/EV7X-BK8J] (“When things
like this happen and the artists get angry, the entire system gets bad PR . . . .”).
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content.80 They will receive a notice to the effect of, “Your video
may include clips that are owned by a third party,” without much
further explanation.81 Fans are led to believe that it is the artist’s
fault, and they do not understand the underlying reasons why
their content is being claimed. In fact, fans are so ill-informed
about the reposting of copyrighted material that many believe
writing “No Copyright Intended” or cutting and pasting fair use
provisions from the 1976 Copyright Act verbatim into the
description box will absolve them from any copyright liability or
claims on their video.82 This confusion and lack of explanation
results in an eroded user experience. Fans who don’t know any
better may believe that the claim came at the direction of the
artist, when this could very well be a policy of the artist’s record
label that is beyond the artist’s control. And the sting of getting
blocked is only magnified when the blocked content is an artist
tribute video, because precluding a fan from expressing her
adoration of the artist amounts to a slap in the face. Thus, it comes
as no surprise that fans may leave the side of a once-loved artist
when there are many copyright claims filed on the artist’s content.
The fans may leave YouTube altogether, disgruntled and disgusted
by their poor user experience, and take their content to another site
that does not have a system akin to Content ID in place or that is
patrolled less stringently than YouTube. All in all, it is bad for
business for both the content owner and the service provider.83
Finally, videos that are taken down will never produce
any revenue for rights holders or YouTube. The only way to
generate revenue is to monetize the content and allow it to
remain on YouTube. Rights holders are benefitting more than
ever from streaming royalties.84 In fact, in 2014, streaming
royalties made up for the current decline in digital downloads.85
80 YouTube has an entire help module dedicated to teaching users about
copyright on YouTube. What Is Copyright?, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/2797466?hl=en&ref_topic=2778546 [http://perma.cc/3LDP-9ZT5] (last visited
June 6, 2016).
81 YouTube’s Joke of a Fair-Use Appeal Process, supra note 51.
82 Andy Baio, No Copyright Intended, WAXY (Dec. 9, 2011), http://waxy.org/
2011/12/no_copyright_intended/ [http://perma.cc/X8F9-AHH8].
83 See generally I Posted a Video That Had a Little Snippet of Rihanna’s Song
“We Found Love” and Youtube Took it Down!, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM,
https://productforums.google.com/forum/#!topic/youtube/tqbuMCA3hKE [http://perma.cc/
W7NA-AMZN] (last visited June 6, 2016) (“So I posted a video that had a little part of
Rihanna’s song ‘We Found Love’ and I truly DO NOT understand why Youtube took it
down! Why can’t I post a video with a song in it?! All the other videos that go onto
Youtube do the same and they don’t get taken down due to copyright issues! It clearly
makes no sense at all and it has pissed me off!”).
84 SeeMasnick, supra note 29.
85 Karp, supra note 12.
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While people may not think of it as such, YouTube is one of the
top streaming content destinations86 and streaming music
services on the web, existing in the same realm as Spotify,
Apple Music, and Pandora.87 Thus, it only makes sense for
rights holders to take advantage of this gigantic revenue pool.
D. Content ID’s Drawbacks
There is no question that Content ID has positively
impacted rights holders by revolutionizing the management and
monetization of copyrighted content. There are, however, various
drawbacks to Content ID’s current system. Among these are (1)
the lack of direct accessibility to Content ID for small-market
musicians, (2) inequitable revenue allocation, (3) Content ID’s
inability to recognize third-party licensing arrangements, (4) ex
post ratification of infringing uses, and (5) the cumbersome and
frustrating user appeals process.
First, only rights holders with a substantial amount of
content on YouTube may sign up for Content ID, leaving
legitimate, small-market artists out of the equation.88 A
songwriter or artist with a single YouTube channel would not be
able to register to manage and patrol their content directly
through Content ID. Oftentimes, songwriters and artists have
transferred the rights in their compositions or sound recordings to
music publishers or record labels.89 Because music publishers and
record labels are aggregators of large amounts of content, they
86 Jeremy Scott, YouTube 2nd Most Popular Website With 790 Million Unique
Monthly Visitors, REELSEO (Aug. 25, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.reelseo.com/youtube-
790-million-uniques/ [http://perma.cc/3J2D-656V].
87 Stuart Dredge, Adele’s Manager: ‘Streaming’s the Future, Whether People Like
it or Not,’ GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2014, 11:05 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/20
14/nov/06/adele-manager-jonathan-dickens-streaming-spotify [http://perma.cc/TX39-XF8A]
(“[B]ut the biggest music streamer out there is YouTube, without a doubt . . . .” (quoting
Jonathan Dickins, Manager of Adele and founder of September Management)).
88 How Content ID Works, supra note 2.
89 See Paul Resnikoff, Now You Know Everything About Music Publishing . . . ,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014/02/
28/understandpublishing/ [http://perma.cc/7TFL-3ETE] (“However, recordings are typically
made in assignment of record labels, whom have negotiated deals with both the artist and
producer in which they transfer ownership of their copyright to the label in exchange for
royalty payments. . . . The composition, made by the writers, is typically represented by a
publisher. The sound recording, made by the performing artist and producer, is typically
represented by a label.”); Scott Rubin, Music Publishing: Everything You Wanted to Know
(But Were Afraid to Ask), SOS (Dec. 2005), http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/dec05/
articles/allaboutpublishing.htm [http://perma.cc/3Y6D-V5M9] (“If you want to make money
as a songwriter, composer or lyricist, the obvious answer is to find yourself a publisher.”).
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easily qualify for Content ID.90 Thus, artists without labels or
publishing deals are out of luck. Artists that are not fortunate
enough to sign a record or publishing deal, however, may be able
to sign up with a multichannel network (MCN) as an alternative,
but again this requires a certain level of subscribership that cuts
out the “little guy.” MCNs are content aggregators, and some
function almost as miniature record labels that live on YouTube.91
MCNs will monitor and assert content owners’ rights on
YouTube, and many artists partner with MCNs for help with
overall YouTube strategy and revenue maximization.92
Second, the royalty pie is somewhat arbitrary, and the
revenue allocation cuts out the owners of compositions. The
way money is distributed on YouTube is about an even split
between YouTube and the content owners (representing the
visual, audio, and underlying composition).93 The exact split is
55-45, where YouTube receives 45% of ad revenue and rights
holders receive 55%.94 On the rights holder’s side, “10% goes to
the owner of the visual, 30% goes to the owner of the sound
recording, and 15% goes to the owner of the composition.”95
These ratios are somewhat arbitrary. For example, songwriters
get paid half of what sound recording owners receive. Owners
of compositions have expressed a general sentiment that they
90 Music labels range from the major record labels (Sony, Warner Music
Group, and Universal) to independent labels like Glassnote Records (Mumford & Sons)
and Big Machine Records (Taylor Swift). See Heather McDonald, Big Four Record
Labels, ABOUT CAREERS (Dec. 16, 2014), http://musicians.about.com/od/music
industrybasics/g/BigFour.htm [http://perma.cc/5MCC-XGEN]; Ed Christman, Could the
Big Machine, Glassnote Deals with Clear Channel Set Market Rate for Radio
Royalties?, BILLBOARD (Mar. 6, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/1551224/could-the-big-machine-glassnote-deals-with-clear-channel-set-m
arket-rate [http://perma.cc/DZ5J-99BE] (mentioning that independent labels such as
Glassnote Records and Big Machine Records have signed deals with large radio
networks). Music publishers also range from major publishers (Sony, WarnerChappell,
Universal) to independent publishers like SONGS Music Publishing (Lorde, The
Weeknd, Diplo). See Rubin, supra note 89; SONGS MUSIC PUBLISHING, https://
www.songspub.com/ [http://perma.cc/UA5H-V8ES] (last visited June 6, 2016);
Songwriters, SONGS MUSIC PUBLISHING, https://www.songspub.com/Songwriters
[http://perma.cc/SPN6-XPXK] (last visited June 6, 2016).
91 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
92 Id.
93 Todd Spangler, YouTube Standardizes Ad-Revenue Split for All Partners, but
Offers Upside Potential, VARIETY (Nov. 1, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://variety.com/
2013/digital/news/youtube-standardizes-ad-revenue-split-for-all-partners-but-offers-upside-
potential-1200786223/ [http://perma.cc/S3ZX-DZBF].
94 Id.; see Hampp, supra note 23. Content owners are generally disgruntled
over this royalty split arrangement because it is not in line with Apple’s 70/30
arrangement, where content owners are paid 70% of profits. YouTube justifies this split
because of the resources, bandwidth, servers, and maintenance that is spent on
maintaining its system. Spangler, supra note 93.
95 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
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are underpaid, not only on YouTube, but across streaming
music services.96
The inequity does not end there. Not only are owners of
compositions stiffed, but so are users. Returning to the wedding
video example: your cousin uploads her wedding video backed by
Bruno Mars’s latest hit. Your cousin’s video is comprised of Mars’s
recording and composition and your cousin’s visual of her
wedding. In theory, your cousin should be entitled to 10% of the
revenue for her visual, and the other 45% should go to Bruno
Mars’s publisher and record label. Yet your cousin will most likely
never see any money.97 Perhaps it is because amateur users like
your cousin do not have access to Content ID to be able to
properly monetize the visual component of their videos, or
perhaps YouTube feels that as a penalty for infringing on the
rights holder’s copyrights in the first place, your cousin’s 10% of
the pie should be split by the other rights holders.
The impact is magnified when it comes to the amateur
cover artist because he is cut out of two revenue streams—the
visual (10%) and the sound recording (30%).98 Although users
have the option to monetize their videos from their channel
dashboard, this option does not let a user assert his rights as to
specific copyrightable components, and the owner must own all
the content in the video to see any money from it.99 And even if
the revenue from the visual or sound recording of a user’s video
is collected on behalf of the user and held in escrow, it most
likely would only remain in escrow for a limited period of time
before it is absorbed by YouTube.100
Third, Content ID is unable to account for third-party
licensing agreements.101 YouTube has no way of knowing whether
a user has precleared his use by licensing a master recording or
composition directly from a record label, music publisher, or some
other third party,102 because their respective licensing databases
96 See David Israelite, Future of Streaming Music Must Include Fairness for
Songwriters, FOX NEWS OPINION (June 26, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/
06/26/future-streaming-music-must-include-fairness-for-songwriters.html [http://perma.cc/
FM9T-2PYU].
97 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. For example, SoundExchange, the statutorily created body that collects
digital performance royalties for sound recordings, typically absorbs royalties that
remain undistributed after three years. SOUNDEXCHANGE, SOUNDEXCHANGE ANNUAL
REPORT FOR 2013, at 4 (2013), http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/06/2013-SoundExchange-Fiscal-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/EU7U-UVGL].
101 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
102 Id.
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do not communicate with YouTube.103 For example, a cover artist
who wishes to post a Sam Smith cover could go to Sam Smith’s
publishers to license the use of the composition for a YouTube
video. Nevertheless, the cover artist’s video could be claimed by
the composition owner as if the content were not licensed at all—a
patently unfair result.104 Users must essentially overcome the
presumption that they have not licensed the content—and to
make matters worse, they must overcome this presumption via
the cumbersome user appeals process discussed below, where the
rights holder is in the driver’s seat. There are companies that
specialize in issuing licenses for master recordings and
compositions for digital video distribution,105 but they do not
communicate to YouTube information about who and what they
license.106 The only way that YouTube knows whether content has
been licensed properly is if it is licensed on-platform from small,
precleared music and sample libraries that YouTube itself has
made available.107 Because there is no way of knowing whether a
use is licensed, Content ID discourages users from obtaining
licenses in the first place. The policy is likely a reflection of the
general sentiment among consumers that content is “free” and no
license is ever necessary, because the worst that can happen is a
copyright strike on a user’s YouTube account.108
Fourth, Content ID is designed to ratify infringing use; it
is an ex post enforcement tool.109 This is in opposition to ex ante
enforcement, where the user obtains a license before using the
copyrighted content. In a perfect world, intellectual property is
licensed before the use occurs. In reality, rarely if ever do users
103 Id.
104 YouTube is putting somewhat of a bandage on the situation via a special
covers program that allows cover artist to receive the revenue from their videos, but
that is currently in a limited-rollout beta phase. Id.
105 See, e.g., AUDIOSOCKET, https://www.audiosocket.com/ [http://perma.cc/T3EK-
LJYV] (last visited June 6, 2016); RUMBLEFISH, http://rumblefish.com/ [http://perma.cc/
K6MX-SCSB] (last visited June 6, 2016); Ryan Lawler, Rumblefish’s Friendly Music
Relaunches With 750k Songs, GIGAOM (Mar. 16, 2012, 10:22 AM), https://
gigaom.com/2012/03/16/rumblefish-friendly-music-relaunch/ [http://perma.cc/B8TF-B3MK].
106 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
107 Jacob Kastrenakes, YouTube Launches Library of Free Music That Anyone
Can Use, VERGE (Sept. 25, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/9/25/
4769332/youtube-audio-library-launches-150-royalty-free-songs [http://perma.cc/QWN5
-4Y7F]; see also Audio Library, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/audiolibrary/music
[http://perma.cc/D4TG-Y9AX] (last visited June 6, 2016) (containing the YouTube audio
library).
108 There is some penalty, although not criminal: once the user has
accumulated three strikes, the user loses his or her YouTube account. Copyright Strike
Basics, supra note 58.
109 See generally Arsham, supra note 13 (defining ex post and ex ante
enforcement of the copyright law, and discussing the pros and cons of each).
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obtain licenses prior to uploading content because again, it is so
ingrained in users’ minds that they can post anything they want.
It is a persistent issue that plagues rights holders, as it requires
them to constantly patrol content instead of knowing that uses
are precleared and accounted for beforehand. Further, this
phenomenon is bad for content owners because they cannot
monetize views before the video is claimed. Thus, in the time it
takes content owners to track down infringing videos, they miss
out on key revenue opportunities, especially because many videos
garner the most engagement in the few days after they are
initially uploaded.110 This problem may be bigger than Content ID
itself, perhaps reflecting a general shift from preclearing rights to
ratification of infringement. In other words, it is an “upload first,
assess later” paradigm, and the law must adapt to this reality, as
expansion of the compulsory license would alleviate these issues.
Finally, Content ID’s cumbersome appeals process is a
headache that users must undergo when disputing claims. It
negatively affects content owners as well. When an upload is
matched against copyrighted content, the user has the ability to
file a dispute with YouTube against the claim by saying that it is
the user’s original, wholly owned content, that it is a fair use,111 or
that the use has been licensed.112 When a user disputes the claim,
the claim goes from active to pending, and the match policy
(whether it be block, monetize, or track) is lifted temporarily until
the rights holder has assessed the dispute.113 At that point, the
rights holder must decide within 30 days whether to release the
claim, reinstate the claim, or perform a takedown.114 If the rights
110 See Chris Atkinson, A Quarter of Branded Video Shares Happen in the
First Three Days: Unruly’s Social Diffusion Curve, REELSEO (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.reelseo.com/quarter-video-shares-happen-days-unrulys-social-diffusion-curve/
[http://perma.cc/R5WT-PTBL].
111 A fair use is
any copying of copyrighted material done for a limited and “transformative”
purpose, such as to comment upon, criticize, or parody a copyrighted work.
Such uses can be done without permission from the copyright owner. In other
words, fair use is a defense against a claim of copyright infringement. If [a] use
qualifies as a fair use, then it [is] not []considered an illegal infringement. So
what is a “transformative” use? . . . . [T]his definition [is] ambiguous [and]
vague . . . . [M]illions of dollars in legal fees have been spent attempting to
define what qualifies as a fair use. There are no hard-and-fast rules, only
general rules and varied court decisions, because the judges and lawmakers
who created the fair use exception did not want to limit its definition.
Rich Stim, What Is Fair Use?, STANFORD UNIV. LIBR., http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/
fair-use/what-is-fair-use/ [http://perma.cc/9X36-BYSS] (last updatedMar. 11, 2014, 4:32 PM).
112 YouTube’s Joke of a Fair-Use Appeal Process, supra note 51.
113 Pacheco, supra note 34.
114 Id.
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holder does nothing, the claim on the content is released.115 If the
claim is reinstated, users in good copyright standing116 who have
provided an address and phone number may appeal the
reinstatement, shifting the burden back to the rights holder to
either release the claim or issue a takedown.117
There are a few drawbacks to this user appeals process.
First, the rights holder must manually review the dispute,
meaning that a human being representing the rights holder must
log in to Content ID, view the allegedly infringing content, and
determine whether the dispute is valid.118 More often than not,
users will dispute the claim because no user wants to have their
video blocked.119 Thus, tens of thousands of claims stack up daily
that must be manually reviewed—an impossible task.120 Many
claims are released because they are not reviewed within the 30-
day window, and content owners lose revenue as a result.121
Next, those manually reviewing the content in the user
appeals process are often not qualified to do so, resulting in
abusive and mismanaged claims practices.122 If a user disputes
a claim on a fair use basis, the decision of whether to honor the
dispute rests largely in the hands of interns and other
115 Id.
116 Good standing means that a user account must have “[n]o Community
Guidelines strikes, [n]o copyright strikes, [and] [n]o more than one video blocked worldwide
by Content ID.” Keep Your YouTube Account in Good Standing, YOUTUBE, https://
support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797387?hl=en [http://perma.cc/9V74-GZBU] (last visited
June 6, 2016).
117 Id.; See Frederic Lardinois, YouTube Changes Its Content ID Appeals
Process, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 3, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/03/youtube-changes-
its-content-id-appeals-process/ [http://perma.cc/WM2Z-7JC4]; Baio, supra note 18. For a
visualization of the claim and disputes process, see Disputes, YOUTUBE, https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/6085539?hl=en&ref_topic=6084219 [http://perma.cc/CX42-6XM2]
(last visited June 6, 2016).




122 See Orchard Uses UNPAID INTERNS to Handle Content ID Related
Disputes, YOUTUBE (July 29, 2013), https://productforums.google.com/forum/#!topic
/youtube/10XE-nsJbaM [http://perma.cc/MBL3-7V57] [hereinafter Orchard]. In fact,
drawing from personal experience, I worked extensively in Content ID as an intern at
several large companies and made countless final judgments on submitted user disputes,
many of which involved fair use. What constitutes fair use is not a simple matter, as even
the most astute lawyers and judges struggle to define it. See supra note 109 and
accompanying text. Thus, it is baffling that interns are tasked with making these
decisions on a daily basis. One bit of good news is that a recent Ninth Circuit decision
now requires copyright holders to consider fair use before issuing DMCA takedown
notices. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus,
rights holders must take more precaution before requesting takedowns, which will likely
assist in curbing abuse and provide a bit of relief to prejudiced users.
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unqualified individuals.123 This is especially troubling because
these decisions, which necessarily involve questions of fact and
law, happen outside an administrative body or court of law and
are virtually free from any oversight.124 YouTube cannot even
begin to provide human oversight because their resources are
far too limited to identify and diagnose indiscretions by
innumerable content holders. Also, YouTube prefers to turn a
blind eye and limit its oversight, or else it may be liable for
copyright infringement.125
Furthermore, Content ID as a whole heavily favors
copyright owners.126 Rights holders are in a position of power for
regulating user content, as they make the final decision in their
sole discretion about whether to issue a takedown.127 There is no
hearing or opportunity to present evidence to a neutral body.128
Content owners are the ultimate arbiters, which is troubling
because of the inherent bias that rights holders possess in favor of
protecting their content at all costs.129 YouTube is also inherently
biased, as it is a corporation with a goal of maximizing profits for
shareholders, and the more content that is claimed, the more
money YouTube makes. It seems preposterous that fair use
copyright adjudications are being made by anyone other than a
judge, let alone in such large numbers. As a result, the user
appeals method of resolving content disputes is wrought with
123 Orchard, supra note 122; Concord Music Group, YouTube Rights Management
Intern, ENTERTAINMENTCAREERS, http://www.entertainmentcareers.net/Concord-Music-
Group/YouTube-Rights-Management-Intern/job/199903/ [http://perma.cc/F7Y7-C2HV] (last
visited June 6, 2016) (posting for a YouTube Rights Management Intern).
124 Philip Daniels & Tyler Malin, Content ID & DMCA Takedowns: What
Creators Need to Know, VIDEOINK (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.thevideoink.com/
features/voices/content-id-dmca-takedowns-what-creators-need-to-know/#.VF59x4vF_A4
[http://perma.cc/67K9-F8AR] (“Many argue that the current system seems to skew in
favor of copyright owners. In fact, everything prior to the DMCA takedown notice
required after an appeal is just internal policy and completely extrajudicial—
undoubtedly leaving the vast majority of these potentially important legal arguments
without proper consideration, which is damaging for everyone involved.”).
125 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). See generally Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676
F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing that the DMCA provides a “safe harbor” from liability
stemming from copyright infringement for service providers such as YouTube, provided that
they follow certain rules and procedures regarding copyrighted content; the safe harbor can
be forfeited in a variety of circumstances, including if the service provider has actual
knowledge of infringement, and thus, service providers wish to limit their knowledge when
it comes to specific instances of infringement on their sites).
126 Daniels & Malin, supra note 124.
127 See id. (“[T]he decision to accept or reject a counter-notification is purely
based on the decision of the party that Content ID matched with [the user’s content].”).
128 Jennifer Atkins, Ashley Madison, the DMCA, and the Misuse of Copyright Law,
CLOUDIGY L. (July 29, 2015), http://cloudigylaw.com/ashley-madison-dmca-misuse-
copyright-law/ [http://perma.cc/9AYM-QKJJ]; see Baio, supra note 18; Daniels & Malin,
supra note 124.
129 See Daniels & Malin, supra note 124.
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widespread abuse130 and results in erosion of the user experience.131
This is grossly unfair to users, and rights holders know it.132
II. THE SECTION 115 COMPULSORY LICENSE
The current section 115 compulsory license for musical
works provides a necessary backdrop against which to evaluate a
compulsory synchronization licensing system. It helps inform our
understanding of how compulsory licensing currently works, what
rights it covers, and how it interacts with YouTube. It also shows
that a compulsory sync license is practically attainable because
Congress has shown its willingness to expand compulsory
licensing for music to encompass new technologies, such as
Internet radio. Finally, the section 115 license serves as a model
for evaluating the pros and cons of compulsory licensing systems.
Generally, a compulsory license allows the use of a
copyrighted work without the consent of the copyright owner,
provided that the user pays royalties and meets certain
conditions.133 Section 115 of the Copyright Act134 provides for
compulsory licensing of nondramatic musical works if the work
has been distributed by the copyright owner to the public in the
United States and the licensee complies with the various
provisions of section 115.135 The compulsory license grants a
licensee the right to “make and distribute phonorecords” of the
work, and the licensee’s purpose must be to distribute the musical
130 See Tim Cushing, Fair Use Continues to Pay the Price for YouTube’s Direct
Takedown Deal with Universal Music Group, TECHDIRT (July 14, 2014, 2:14 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140706/13381127795/fair-use-continues-to-pay-price-yo
utubes-direct-takedown-deal-with-universal-music-group.shtml [http://perma.cc/93V2-
X9QA] (discussing erosion of fair use because of potential abuse of Content ID–type system
on popular music streaming service SoundCloud).
131 Daniels & Malin, supra note 124. Even more troubling is that the only
mechanism Congress provided to combat abuse of the DMCA (and thus, the only way
for a user to have the rights holder’s decision reviewed) is to file a costly section 512(f)
lawsuit, alleging that the rights holder misrepresented that the user content was
infringing. See Amanda Schreyer, Misrepresentation Under the DMCA: The State of the
Law, 25 NYSBA ENT., ARTS, & SPORTS L.J. 72, 72-73 (2014). There have been few
lawsuits filed under section 512(f) because no normal, everyday user has the incentive
to be litigious over a simple cover video. As if costly litigation isn’t bar enough, most
section 512(f) cases settle before making it past the motion to dismiss stage, and the
first time a court ever awarded damages under this provision was March 2015. Atkins,
supra note 128. Undoubtedly, whether intentional or not, this is a system built to
abuse the “little guy.”
132 See YouTube’s Joke of a Fair-Use Appeal Process, supra note 51.
133 UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73, COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR
MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS 3 (2015), http://copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H4MD-K8A8] [hereinafter COMPULSORYLICENSE].
134 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
135 Id.
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works to the public for private use.136 Not only are physical goods
included within the scope of section 115, but digital phonorecord
downloads and Internet streaming are included, as well.137 For
clarity’s sake, the section 115 provisions do not apply to the
performance right—only to reproduction and distribution.138
To obtain a compulsory license, one must serve notice of
the intention to do so on the copyright owner “before or within
thirty days after making, and before distributing any phonorecords
of the work.”139 Failure to comply with this provision makes the
act of reproduction or distribution of phonorecords an infringing
activity. To receive royalties under section 115, the copyright
owner must be identified in the work’s registration in the
Copyright Office’s records.140
Statutory royalties are provided for in paragraph (c) of
section 115, which states in relevant part,
[T]he royalty under a compulsory license shall be payable for every
phonorecord made and distributed in accordance with the license. For
this purpose, . . . a phonorecord is considered “distributed” if the person
exercising the compulsory license has voluntarily and permanently
parted with its possession. With respect to each work embodied in the
phonorecord, the royalty shall be either two and three-fourths cents, or
one-half of one cent per minute of playing time or fraction thereof,
whichever amount is larger.141
Contrary to the above passage, the mechanical-license royalty
rates have been adjusted over the years to reflect changes in
136 Id. Phonorecords are defined by the copyright act as
material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
“phonorecords” includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Phonorecords include digital files such as mp3s. MARY
LAFRANCE, COPYRIGHT IN ANUTSHELL 163 (2d ed. 2011).
137 See Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, Including
Digital Phonorecord Deliveries, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,802 (July 16, 2008) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pts. 201, 255) (“[M]indful of the attempts to develop legislation that would reform
Section 115, the Office now proposes to amend its regulations in a way that would enable
digital music services to utilize the compulsory license to clear all reproduction and
distribution rights in musical works that might be necessary in order to engage in activities
such as the making of full downloads, Limited Downloads, On-Demand streams and non-
interactive streams.” (emphasis added)).
138 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). Section 115 explicitly states that one may obtain a
compulsory license only to “make and distribute phonorecords of the work,” not to
perform it. Id. (emphasis added).
139 37 C.F.R. § 201.18 (2012).
140 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1).
141 Id. § 115(c)(2).
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the marketplace and inflation.142 In fact, the Copyright Royalty
and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 created the Copyright
Royalty Board (CRB), which sets the rates and terms for use of
the section 115 license.143
Considering the section 115 provisions as applied to
YouTube, the following is a breakdown of the rights a user must
obtain to post a video to YouTube. In the example from the
introduction, where a Bruno Mars recording is synced to a
wedding video, the uploader should obtain the rights to use both
the sound recording from the record label and the composition
from the music publisher. The exclusive rights in the composition
that are implicated by uploading a video to YouTube include the
right to reproduce the work,144 distribute copies of the work,145 and
synchronize the work with a visual image.146 The exclusive rights
implicated in the use of the sound recording include the
reproduction right,147 the distribution right,148 and the “master
142 What Are Mechanical Royalty Rates?, HARRY FOX AGENCY,
https://www.harryfox.com/license_music/what_mechanical_royalty_rates.html [http://perma.cc/
EYF6-SQX5] (last visited June 6, 2016).
143 See COMPULSORY LICENSE, supra note 133. The current statutory rate is
the greater of 9.1 cents per song or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time. See
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 63 Fed.
Reg. 7288, 7289 (Feb. 13, 1998). This rate has not changed since January 1, 2006. Id.
144 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012). The reproduction right is implicated because
the user necessarily makes a copy of the digital file of the recording when uploading it
to YouTube. YouTube is also responsible for paying a royalty for the right to stream the
content. This “streaming” right is a subset of the reproduction right. Jeff Price, Music
Industry Survival Guide, TUNECORE, http://www.tunecore.com/guides/sixrights [http://
perma.cc/Z3AR-M4XJ] (last visited June 6, 2016).
145 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). The distribution right is implicated when the user
uploads the video to YouTube, because the content is being published to the world for
public viewing.
146 The synchronization right is neither explicitly mentioned in the current
Copyright Act nor in its predecessor. Yet courts and commentators generally agree that the
right is statutorily protected. Indeed, the House Report to the 1976 Act confirms this
conclusion: “[The] exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called ‘bundle of rights’ that is a
copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases.” Lewis Rinaudo Cohen, The
Synchronization Right: Business Practices and Legal Realities, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 787, 793-
95 (1986) (footnotes omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976)). There may also be a
performance right involved depending upon what entity is considered to be “performing” the
video and whether individual plays of a video are considered “public” performances for the
purposes of the Copyright Act. The most plausible explanation is that once the user uploads
the content, YouTube itself is the one performing the content from its servers, not the user.
Thus, the user does not have a duty to obtain performance rights from the copyright holder.
This is supported by the fact that YouTube pays performance royalties to performing-rights
organizations before any royalty distributions are made to rights holders. See ASCAP
Members: License Your YouTube Synchs Through NMPA & HFA, ASCAP (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.ascap.com/playback/2011/11/action/license-your-youtube.aspx [http://perma.cc/
658R-CF8C] (ASCAP acknowledging that YouTube pays it performance royalties separately
from Content ID revenue).
147 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
148 Id. § 106(3).
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use” or synchronization right.149 For a cover artist video, it is only
necessary to obtain the rights implicated in the use of the
composition, because the cover artist provides his own original
sound recording of his performance of the musical composition.
Section 115 only provides for the licensing of musical
compositions and not for sound recordings.150 In the Bruno Mars
wedding video hypothetical, then, the user can use the section 115
license to obtain the reproduction and distribution rights for the
composition without the publisher’s consent, but the user must
obtain separate permission to use the sound recording as well.
Further, even if a user were to obtain a section 115
license for the use of the composition, the current section 115
license does not go far enough to clear all the rights necessary to
fully exploit the musical composition on YouTube. Section 115
only provides for the reproduction and distribution rights, but
not the synchronization right.151 This right must then be
obtained separately from the owner of the composition in order
to cover the use of the composition on YouTube.152 These myriad
restrictions and regulations beg the question: How is it possible
for a layperson to figure out and understand the patchwork of
rights that are necessary to post a video to YouTube without
being susceptible to liability for copyright infringement?
In addition to section 115, section 114 of the Copyright Act
creates a compulsory license for “non-interactive services” to
digitally perform phonorecords.153 The license grants qualifying
services the ability to perform sound recordings (i.e., broadcast
149 How to Acquire Music for Films, supra note 15.
150 Id. at 2.
151 Modifications in the Copyright Act of 1976 make clear that section 115 does not
cover the “synchronization” right. This is because only the reproduction of phonorecords (not
audiovisual works) is covered under the compulsory license. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(1) (2012)
(“When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the public in
the United States under the authority of the copyright owner, any other person . . . may, by
complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and
distribute phonorecords of the work.”). See supra note 133 for a discussion of what a
phonorecord is.
152 Furthermore, if it is assumed that users are the ones publicly performing the
composition on YouTube and are thus responsible for obtaining performance rights, the
section 115 license would fail to cover this as well. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(1). Moreover,
assuming users are publicly performing the content could preclude use of the section 115
license altogether, as section 115 only provides for licenses for reproduction and distribution
of phonorecords to the public for private use. A public performance on a public platform is
probably not a private use. An alternate theory is that the user is not responsible for the
performance right because each time a video is performed on YouTube, it is a private
performance that an individual, unique user requests, most likely in the privacy of his own
home. In that case, the section 115 licensewould cover the distribution right.
153 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012); Compulsory Licensing Provisions, DIMA, http://
www.digmedia.org/issues-and-policy/copyright-and-royalties/140-compulsory-licensing-
provisions [http://perma.cc/BE8M-2Z6E] (last visited June 6, 2016).
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them across the Internet) at a per stream rate determined by the
CRB. Noninteractive services include Pandora, Sirius XM, and
any other streaming services where users can only dial up a
station or playlist but not specific songs.154 YouTube is not
considered a noninteractive service because users have the ability
to select any piece of content for viewing on the platform at any
time.155 Although YouTube does not fall within its scope,156 section
114 is nonetheless important, because it evinces Congress’s
willingness to expand the reach of the compulsory license. It
shows that we are closer than we think to compulsory sync
licensing because Congress has recognized the specific need for
compulsory licensing on other streaming services.
Many commentators have criticized compulsory licensing
on various grounds.157 One argument is that the purpose of the
law seems inconsistent with the policy behind copyright because
it “create[s] a mandatory non-negotiable contract where the
property owner is forced to give virtually unlimited use of his
154 Ken Consor, The 2 Types of Streaming Royalties & How You Can Collect Both,
SONGTRUST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://blog.songtrust.com/publishing-tips-2/the-2-types-of-digital-
music-streams-how-you-can-collect-royalties-from-both/ [http://perma.cc/R7SJ-WPED]; see
also John Simson, Spotify, Pandora and the Changing Nature of Payments in the Music
Industry, LOMMEN (2012), http://www.lommen.com/pdf/SXSW-2012/Spotify-Pandora-and-
the-Changing-Nature-of-Payment.aspx [http://perma.cc/8QHQ-FXHY].
155 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) defines an “interactive service” as
one that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program
specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular
sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by or on
behalf of the recipient. The ability of individuals to request that particular sound
recordings be performed for reception by the public at large, or in the case of a
subscription service, by all subscribers of the service, does not make a service
interactive, if the programming on each channel of the service does not
substantially consist of sound recordings that are performed within 1 hour of the
request or at a time designated by either the transmitting entity or the individual
making such request. If an entity offers both interactive and noninteractive
services (either concurrently or at different times), the noninteractive component
shall not be treated as part of an interactive service.
156 Nonetheless, the section 114 license is an important talking point because it
shows Congress’s willingness to expand the compulsory right and adjust licensing practices
to changes in consumption. Most importantly, it also shows a patchwork of statutorily
granted rights evincing a trend towards a statutorily granted synchronization right. See
infra Section III.E.
157 See generally Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger, Compositions Are Being Sold for a
Song: Proposed Legislation and New Licensing Opportunities Demonstrate the
Unfairness of Compulsory Licensing to Owners of Musical Compositions, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 803 (2008); Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Time to Say Good-Bye to Madonna’s American
Pie: Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 285, 299 (2001); Dina LaPolt et al., A Response to Professor Menell: A Remix
Compulsory License Is Not Justified, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365 (2015); Skyla Mitchell,
Reforming Section 115: Escape from the Byzantine World of Mechanical Licensing, 24
CARDOZO ARTS&ENT. L.J. 1239 (2007).
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work in exchange for a rate he cannot determine.”158 It seems
constitutionally questionable that the government provides a
mechanism for taking private intellectual property without any
balancing of the copyright owner’s interest.159 Others have
criticized compulsory licensing on the grounds that it creates a
false price ceiling160 and that its arbitrary rate-setting procedures
hurt artists by not taking into account the relative value of each
individual piece of intellectual property.161 Critics have also
argued that compulsory licensing fails to provide an adequate
remedy short of launching a full-blown copyright infringement
lawsuit162 and that it chills innovation by “ossify[ing] around
existing patterns of use.”163 These arguments are certainly
justified; however, the myriad benefits of compulsory licensing
outweigh its negatives. Further, the only way that compulsory
licensing “ossifies” around existing patterns of use is if Congress
allows that to happen.
On the other hand, many also support expansion of the
compulsory right.164 One justification is that in a “remix
culture,”165 a compulsory licensing regime is the best and most
practical application of the Copyright Act’s protections.166 Because
producing, chopping up, and remixing music has become seamless
due to the proliferation of desktop audio software, it is more and
158 Bevilacqua, supra note 157, at 299.
159 Id.
160 Jason S. Rooks, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory
Licenses in Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 272 (1995).
161 Bevilacqua, supra note 157, at 302; see MATTHEW SAG, THE PERILS OF
COMPULSORY LICENSES IN COPYRIGHT LAW, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/
files/Sag.Matthew.pdf [http://perma.cc/L8AN-M7YS] (last visited June 6, 2016).
162 This is because the improper or unlicensed use of material under section
115 would be an infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 501-505 (2012). Costly litigation where there are only pennies at stake (although the
Copyright Act also provides statutory damages) leaves owners with little incentive to
act upon infringement.
163 SAG, supra note 161.
164 See generally Tyler, supra note 25; Robert M. Vrana, The Remix Artist’s
Catch-22: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing for Transformative, Sampling-Based
Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811 (2011); James H. Richardson, Create a Compulsory
Licensing Scheme for On-Demand Digital Media Platforms, 31 ENT. & SPORTS LAW.,
Summer 2014, at 9; Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the
Case for Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. REV.
375 (2006); James H. Richardson, The Spotify Paradox: How the Creation of a
Compulsory License Scheme for Streaming On-Demand Music Platforms Can Save the
Music Industry, 22 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45 (2014).
165 See generally Matt Jessell, Remix Culture: Rethinking What We Call Original
Content, MARKETING LAND (Apr. 30, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://marketingland.com/remix-culture-
rethinking-what-we-call-original-content-41791 [http://perma.cc/CX4P-C5PJ] (describing
how the remix culture represents a shift in how we think about what is original, what is not
original, and whether it even matters in the first place).
166 Vrana, supra note 164, at 852.
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more difficult to track music samples and pay rights holders. This
can be confusing when some recordings or remixes include
hundreds of samples of other recordings. It would be a nightmare
to call each label and publisher to clear the rights to every
sample, for every sample of a recording must be licensed, no
matter how short.167 Compulsory licensing would alleviate the
massive headache and impracticability of clearing all those
samples. Expansion of the compulsory right would also create a
profit incentive for authors of past works to develop new works.168
Further, Congress has been active and forthcoming in continually
recognizing the need for the expansion of the compulsory right with
section 114 (noninteractive webcasters) and section 111 (secondary
transmissions by cable systems).169 Finally, developments and
improvements in technology have made possible complicated
licensing schemes that were not feasible in the past.170
III. THENEED FOR ASPECIALCOMPULSORY SYNCHRONIZATION
LICENSE FORUGCPLATFORMS
This part discusses several rationales that support the
implementation of a special compulsory synchronization license for
UGC platforms. It also discusses how the implementation of a
compulsory sync license would provide direct solutions to the issues
raised above, and is a natural extension of the current regime.
A. Resolution of Content ID’s Flaws
Many Content ID issues, including the inability of
YouTube to recognize third-party licensing arrangements, the ex
post enforcement of infringement, the cumbersome user appeals
process, and unfair royalty splits would be alleviated by a special
compulsory sync license. Beyond YouTube, it would also alleviate
similar issues on other user-generated content platforms (such as
Facebook) that provide a Content ID–like system for managing
content and improve overall management of copyrighted works by
mandating uniformity across platforms.
167 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.
2005) (“Get a license or do not sample.”).
168 Vrana, supra note 164, at 853.
169 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114 (2012). In 1976, Congress gave cable television companies
compulsory licenses for rebroadcasting content originally aired on a broadcast network, and
in 2002, it extended licensing to “small and noncommercial ‘webcasters.’” Vrana, supra note
164, at 851.
170 Vrana, supra note 164, at 851.
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First, YouTube would be able to recognize third-party
licensing arrangements because a compulsory licensing system
would necessitate a central database/clearinghouse for content.
As described earlier, the system treats those who follow the law
and obtain a license the same as those who upload content they
do not own without first obtaining a license.171 YouTube does not
have any way of knowing whether rights have been precleared
from a third party and does not currently remit royalties to
these parties. In the case of a cover artist who wishes to derive
revenue from his original visual and sound recording of a
licensed composition, a special compulsory sync license would
allow him to take advantage of his rightful revenue streams. A
compulsory sync license system would have a central database of
licensed uses that communicates and exchanges metadata and
ownership information among UGC platforms, labels, and
publishers, facilitating the free flow of revenue. The third-party
licensing issue would be ameliorated by accounting for licensed
uses in the database.
The proposed licensing scheme would also resolve the
issue of ex post enforcement of infringement (i.e., enforcing
content owners’ rights after an infringement has been committed)
by moving the system back into an ex ante regime, where all uses
are automatically licensed and precleared. This is good for both
users and content holders, because users won’t have to worry about
losing the content they post, and content holders will no longer
bear such a large burden in patrolling their content. This would
allow content owners to focus on other things, such as ensuring
that the correct metadata and royalty split information is attached
to each license so that remittance of royalties happens seamlessly.
A compulsory license would also eliminate the need for the
cumbersome user appeals process that is currently in place.
Content owners would not have a queue of tens of thousands of
disputed uses that require manual clearing, because a license
would already be granted. This would eliminate manual review
and alleviate the issue of unqualified individuals making
determinations as to whether a piece of content has in fact been
appropriated. If the system finds a match, a license will be issued
and the user will go on without even knowing this has happened.
But the compulsory licensing system is not a panacea for
user appeals; the question of whether the use is “fair” would still
loom. In theory, those invoking fair use would have to be exempt
from the license altogether. This would require some human
171 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
2016] YOU(TUBE), ME, AND CONTENT ID 1303
action to make a determination as to how the malleable
standard is applied. But compulsory license terms would
conceivably not require any further action on the part of the user
(e.g., paying royalties for the use172 or fighting the claim to avoid
having a video taken down). Thus, users in most circumstances
would be indifferent as to whether the use is fair or not, because
a compulsory regime would allow users to keep their content
online at no personal consequence to them.
Finally, a compulsory sync license would divide the royalty
pie more fairly by giving composition owners the opportunity to
grab a bigger, more equitable share of the revenue. It would also
allow Congress another opportunity to consider different metrics
when setting the price of the license. Instead of a flat rate, the
license rate could be based loosely on ad network rates and real-
time shifts in market demand for certain pieces of content.
Advances in technology and mathematical modeling will enable
systems capable of indexing license rates across various ad
networks while taking into account other metrics necessary to
formulate a fairer market value for content. At the very least, a
special compulsory sync license would allow Congress the
opportunity to equalize the current royalty breakdowns that give
owners of musical compositions, namely songwriters and
publishers, the short end of the stick.
A compulsory sync license divides the royalty pie more
fairly by giving users and cover artists the shares of revenue they
deserve. As discussed earlier, users who appropriate a
copyrighted sound recording and composition (such as the
wedding video backed by Bruno Mars) do not see their 10% share
of the revenue from their visual contributions, and cover artists
generally do not see their 40% share of the revenue from the
visual and sound recording contributions.173 A compulsory sync
license system, however, would allow users to take advantage of
these revenue streams and avoid being penalized for committing
infringement. The license would apply automatically, meaning
that no infringement would occur. As a result, the user would not
forfeit his share of the revenue.
172 See infra Section IV.B.
173 See supra Section I.D.
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B. Stronger First Amendment Protections for Web-Based
Content
As discussed above, the oft-invoked “fair use” defense174 is
subject to a lack of diligence and fairness because it is the
copyright holder who ultimately decides whether or not the
content is infringing. A compulsory license would eliminate this
problem, as the content would remain hosted and publicly
available, fair use or not, because the rights will have already
been cleared.175 This would strengthen the First Amendment
protections by correcting the current trend of biased and abusive
overcensoring of content by overzealous copyright owners.176
Further, the DMCA provides that when a takedown
happens, the party whose content was taken down has the
opportunity to file a counter notice.177 When a user files a counter
notice, access to the removed content cannot be reinstated for a
statutorily provided period of at least 10 business days.178 This is
quite troubling, because regardless of whether there actually was
an infringement, the content must stay down for at least 10 days.
This result chills free speech and freedom of expression because
fair uses and licensed uses can be censored by a disgruntled and
abusive copyright owner. Those copyright owners, knowing that
the process of adjudicating claims on Content ID is already biased
in their favor, are given further incentive to abuse the system
under the DMCA, knowing full well that even if there is no actual
copyright infringement occurring, the content will nevertheless be
censored for a minimum of 10 days.179 To make matters worse, as
discussed above, the only recourse for a user is to file a DMCA
misrepresentation suit, which is not worth the time, money, or
stress for most, if not all, users.180 Essentially, the DMCA
singlehandedly imparts mass censorship power to all copyright
174 See supra note 109 and accompanying text for a discussion of fair use.
175 Then the operative question would be whether the content is exempt from
the royalty pool, but that inquiry is ancillary to this discussion.
176 See generally Tiffany Rad & Christopher Mooney, The DMCA & ACTA vs.
Academic & Professional Research: How Misuse of This Intellectual Property Legislation
Chills Research, Disclosure, and Innovation, https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/
presentations/Rad/BlackHat-USA-2010-Rad-DMCA-slides.pdf [http://perma.cc/4YR7-W9Y9]
(last visited June 6, 2016) (describing how copyright owners have abused the laws to censor
content, creating a chilling effect; for example, 37% of DMCA takedown notices Google
receives are invalid).
177 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012).
178 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
179 See generally Rad & Mooney, supra note 176 (describing how copyright
owners have abused the laws to censor content, creating a chilling effect).
180 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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holders. A compulsory licensing system would ameliorate this
chilling effect by extinguishing the specter of infringement
altogether, resulting in evisceration of the DMCA takedown
regime. Fair use or not, infringement or not, content would be
prelicensed and unencumbered.
C. Historical Analogy
Throughout the years, Congress has recognized the need
to amend the copyright law to respond to changes in content
consumption. No compulsory licensing provisions were in place
until what has become the current section 115, section 1(e), was
enacted in 1909.181 Leading up to the passage of section 1(e), there
had been “significant growth of both player pianos and the earlier
forms of recorded music.”182 But because reproducing a song on a
player piano roll183 was not illegal under the then-current
copyright act, music publishers lobbied Congress to expand
protection.184 Although willing to expand protection of the
reproduction right for publishers, Congress was concerned that
publishers would exercise “monopoly power over the recording of
music,”185 just as recording technology was beginning to grow.
Striking a tough balance, Congress expanded protection over new
forms of reproduction and created the section 1(e) compulsory
license, allowing anyone to record a composition without
obtaining a license directly from the copyright holder (provided
that certain other conditions were met).186 Thus, from a use
perspective, in the same way that Congress wanted to protect
against monopolies over recorded music, Congress should enact a
compulsory sync license to protect against the present-day
181 The compulsory licensing provision of the 1909 Copyright Act was known
as section 1(e). An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, ch.
320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
182 Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA
COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 217 (2010) (footnote omitted).
183 A player piano is “a piano that can play automatically when the keys are
actuated electronically or by a pneumatic device controlled by a piano roll.” Player Piano,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/player-piano [http://perma.cc/
2N35-TA32] (last visited June 6, 2016).
184 Abrams, supra note 182, at 218-19.
185 Id. at 219; Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 108 (2005) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, The Register of Copyrights), http://copyright.gov/docs/regstat071205.html
[http://perma.cc/B2NB-QZPD] (“However, due to concerns about potential monopolistic
behavior, Congress also created a compulsory license to allow anyone to make and distribute
a mechanical reproduction of a nondramatic musical work without the consent of the
copyright owner. . . .”).
186 Abrams, supra note 182, at 220-21.
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monopoly copyright owners have on music recorded with visuals.
From a technology perspective, Congress should expand the scope
of the compulsory license to recognize advances in technology that
have given people the capability to make and post music recorded
with visuals with the same ease that they have been able to make
recordings since the early twentieth century. It is quite simply the
natural and necessary extension of our current framework that
reflects modern attitudes towards the use and availability of
copyrighted content.187 The player piano of yesterday is the
YouTube of today.
Another compelling justification for expansion towards a
compulsory sync license is that copyright scholars have found
that the synchronization right may have roots in the prior
section 1(e). Copyright scholar Professor David Nimmer believes
that although the synchronization right is not explicitly found in
the section 1(e) compulsory license, the right itself may stem
from that section.188
D. YouTube Could Easily Administer This System
YouTube is many things. It is both a video platform and a
streaming music service. It is also an enormous database that is
constantly maintained and filled with metadata and ownership
information about every piece of content it hosts. In the past, the
music industry has attempted to install a central repository of
rights-management information, but it has proved infeasible
because of logistical issues.189 This is largely due to the various
collection agencies operating in their own respective vacuums of
rights and refusing to share their catalogs of information and
metadata with other agencies. For example, the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music Inc. are both collective-licensing bodies that license and
collect performance royalties for musical compositions. Another
collective-licensing body, the Harry Fox Agency, licenses
mechanical rights for the reproduction and distribution of musical
compositions. Yet another collection body, SoundExchange,
commissioned by Congress, only collects royalties for
187 To reiterate, Congress has not been bashful about expanding the scope of
compulsory licensing over the years by creating sections 114 and 111. See infra notes
150-57; Section III.E.
188 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.09[E][3] (1985).
189 Kate Holton, Music Industry Working on Global Copyright Database,
REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/21/us-
global-rights-idUSTRE70K56420110121 [http://perma.cc/3PCH-NVW6].
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noninteractive streaming of sound recordings.190 Each of these
entities maintains a separate database, and the information is not
cross-referenced with other collective rights bodies to ensure that
ownership information and metadata are correct.191 These
databases are not as comprehensive or complete as YouTube’s
because the various royalties and the patchwork of rights
necessary to make licensing of content possible on YouTube (e.g.,
composition, sound recording, and audio-visual rights) requires
that data from many of these central bodies reside on YouTube’s
servers. YouTube has properly linked and cross-referenced all of
this data to ensure accurate remittance of royalties.192 YouTube is
the database that the industry has been waiting for, as it has
ingested and catalogued more metadata and information about
each unique piece of content than any other music rights
database before it.193 Now that the database and technology
exists, why not use it to facilitate better licensing practices?
E. The De Facto Compulsory License Regime
Content ID already functions like a compulsory license
system because all major content owners have opted into it.194
It gives content owners a mechanism by which to monetize
user-generated content despite no license being in place, as if it
were already a compulsory system. In fact, when content
owners contractually agree to manage their content through
Content ID, they technically grant YouTube the right to issue a
synchronization license on behalf of the content owner(s) to the
user account each time a video is claimed for monetization.195
For all intents and purposes, this is a private compulsory
190 General FAQ, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/generalfaq/
[http://perma.cc/2QPC-WF6P] (last visited June 6, 2016). The Copyright Office would
be another potential example of a government entity that maintains a large database of
ownership data. But because the law does not require that one register with the
Copyright Office to obtain copyright protection, the Copyright Office’s database is
inevitably incomplete, as many do not register. Copyright in General, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
http://copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html#register [http://perma.cc/JL58-L4VB] (last
visited June 6, 2016).
191 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Most content owners have opted into YouTube, like it or not. Hugh
McIntyre, YouTube Is About to Delete Independent Artists from Its Site, FORBES (June
18, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2014/06/18/youtube-is-
about-to-delete-independent-artists-from-its-site/ [http://perma.cc/6ZVP-AJRN] (“Vice
President and Global Head of Business at YouTube Robert Kyncl recently claimed that
they already had deals with 90% of the industry . . . .”).
195 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
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licensing scheme that has developed in the shadow of the
copyright law in response to changing patterns of consumption.
A striking similarity between Content ID and a traditional
compulsory license regime is that the user never negotiates a
license for the use. Whether the terms are set by statute or by
YouTube, users’ only concern is keeping their content hosted.
There are, however, differences between our current system196
and a compulsory system that could complicate the transition.
First, in a traditional licensing scheme, rates are set by either
federal copyright royalty judges197 or arms-length bargaining,
whereas in the current system, advertiser demand sets the rate.198
Having advertisers set the rate is not necessarily a bad thing.
Some critics of the current compulsory regime believe that a
statutory minimum devalues content by setting a false price
ceiling that does not account for the inherent variance in value
between differing pieces of intellectual property.199 Second, the
formalities of the section 115 statutory framework do not exist on
YouTube.200 This difference is beneficial to users because it makes
the entire licensing process seamless. Casual, everyday users of
YouTube cannot be expected to follow administrative formalities
in clearing a license. Like it or not, this is the world we live in
today, where nearly everyone has Internet access and is able to
create, reproduce, and disseminate content instantaneously.
From a purely legal perspective, today’s compulsory
licensing structure is not far from a compulsory synchronization
regime. The patchwork of rights that are granted between
196 For an explanation of our current compulsory licensing system, see supraPart II.
197 Ali Sternburg, The Copyright Royalty Board: An Explainer, DISRUPTIVE
COMPETITION PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-
property/121615-the-copyright-royalty-board-an-explainer/#.VqIqk7ArIUE [http://perma.cc/
X94Q-3F7T]. The Copyright Royalty Board is a panel of “three Copyright Royalty Judges
who set statutory license rates for certain music services.” Id. They only set rates for
noninteractive streaming services (i.e., services that function like radio, such as Pandora),
not YouTube (which is an interactive streaming service). Id. For further discussion of
interactive versus noninteractive services, see supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
198 How Ads Are Chosen, supra note 22.
199 Bevilacqua, supra note 157, at 299; see Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 118 (2005)
(“Because section 115 and its predecessor have rarely been used as functioning compulsory
licenses and have served simply as a ceiling on the royalty rate in privately negotiated
licenses, it has placed artificial limits on the free marketplace.”); SAG, supra note 161 (“By
definition, a compulsory license bypasses the information aggregation function of the
market. Whether by legislative [fiat], administrative rule-making [or] quasi-judicial
arbitration, the bodies responsible for determining prices under a compulsory license are
typically starved of information and lack the expertize and ability to acquire it.”).
200 When a user uploads a video and a copyright holder claims it for monetization,
the user must merely check a box indicating that they consent to having their video claimed.
No further action is required by the user, and the user is allowed to keep the video. Pacheco,
supra note 34.
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sections 114 and 115 is merely a step away from being a special
sync license. Between the section 115 license, which provides for
reproduction and distribution of compositions, and the section 114
license, which provides for performance royalties for noninteractive
streaming of sound recordings, Congress has shown its willingness
to expand the compulsory right and adjust licensing practices to
changes in consumer consumption. The proliferation of video-
content providers should prompt Congress to expand the right in
the same way it did when Internet radio providers came into being.
F. Reducing Transaction Costs, Improving User
Experience, and Expanding Access to Content
Content ID and compulsory licenses are extremely
efficient because of the minimal transaction costs, given that the
user negotiates nothing. For most people, the transaction cost of
licensing music for a video is too high. For example, the content
creator might not know how to get in touch with the copyright
owner or how to ask the copyright holder for the rights. In
addition, the content creator might not be able to afford to send a
lawyer to negotiate the contract. Both Content ID and compulsory
licenses help users by dramatically lowering transaction costs so
the user can create derivative content and so the copyright owner
can get some payment without having to play legal whack-a-mole.
Lowering the transaction costs of using copyrighted content is
great for the “little guy” who does not have the wherewithal to
license or pay, and it would also highly benefit artists and
songwriters through large cost savings on administration fees.201
A special compulsory license for UGC platforms would also
result in a much-improved user experience. No longer would
users receive frivolous copyright claims on their videos and have
to undergo the cumbersome user appeals process that weighs so
heavily in favor of content owners. Curing the cumbersome user
appeals process would benefit rights holders by reducing their
load on reasserting rights to disputed claims. A compulsory
license system would also make users “partners” in a sense.
Instead of telling users that their video has been “claimed by
Sony” on copyright grounds, a compulsory licensing system would
201 See Holton, supra note 189 (“The industry estimates that 100 million euros
each year could be saved in copyright administration fees and returned to song writers and
the industry by simplifying the current system.”); see also Andrew D. Stephenson,
Webcaster II: A Case Study of Business to Business Rate Setting by Formal Rulemaking, 7
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 393, 399 (2011) (explaining that imposition of a compulsory scheme
lowers transaction costs for both copyright owners and copyright users).
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perhaps tell them they have been issued a limited license to use
the work on YouTube only, making all users “partners.” It would
result in a less adversarial system where users would not have
such an “us-versus-them” mentality when dealing with posted
content.202 Further, a compulsory sync license would have a
democratizing effect on access to content. The current framework
serves to chill content via the provisions of the DMCA203 and
abusive claim practices that disenfranchise users.204 The
compulsory sync license would eliminate this inequity by
expanding access to content.
The compulsory sync license would eliminate other
chilling effects as well. One problem with the current system is
that any individual stakeholder to a piece of copyrighted content
may veto its use on YouTube, despite the intentions of the other
stakeholders.205 For example, take a song that has seven writers
(which is certainly not uncommon today),206 of which one of the
writers owns 1%. Even if the other six songwriters have set up
Content ID so that matches are monetized, if the 1% writer has
instituted a block or takedown policy, he will block the other
rights holders from receiving any revenue from the work, despite
their preference to monetize. This is because YouTube must
always abide by the most conservative policy set on a video,207 or
else an infringement of the 1% owner’s rights would occur. Any
cowriter, no matter how small the stake, is given a nuclear veto
power that forecloses other rights holders from enjoying revenue
from a specific piece of content. Even worse are instances where
an entity that does not even own the rights to the content it is
202 See generally YouTube’s Joke of a Fair-Use Appeal Process, supra note 51.
The tenor of this article demonstrates that users feel betrayed, that they do not have a
fair shot at having their voices heard, and that the process is a “joke.”
203 See supra Section III.C.
204 See supra Section I.E.
205 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
206 Bob Lefsetz, The Story Is Not the Music, LEFSETZ LETTER (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://lefsetz.com/wordpress/index.php/archives/2013/12/19/the-story-is-not-the-music/
[http://perma.cc/CF64-MBC4] (“Come on. Art is about inspiration. How much inspiration is
there in records made by committee? It’s all formula, all the time.”).
207 Pro Tips & Advanced Resources: Rights Management, YOUTUBE, https://
support.google.com/youtube/answer/6106902?hl=en&ref_topic=6084219 [http://perma.cc/
55BZ-84CW] (last visited June 6, 2016) (“YouTube associates a policy with a video whenever
someone claims the video. When a video has multiple valid claims and therefore
multiple valid policies associated with it, YouTube applies whichever policy results in
the most restrictive action. If one policy says to monetize the video and another says to
block it, YouTube blocks the video.”); see also Ari Hestand, Jeff Price and Audiam Look
to Fix YouTube’s Royalty System, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014), http://
www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2014/01/21/jeff-price-audiam [http://perma.cc/287M-
FNRM] (explaining that “YouTube will not monetize a video unless they have clearance” for
the copyright in the composition, master, and video).
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claiming seeks to block or take down content that the rightful
copyright owners want to monetize.208 Again, one disgruntled
rights holder or abusive content claimant has the power to stall
the money train for everyone else. And aside from the monetary
concern, it also has a chilling effect on ideas, innovation, and
proliferation of content due to overcensorship.209
A compulsory sync license would ameliorate these issues
by automatically granting a license to use the work, regardless of
whether one co-owner or all the co-owners wanted to veto the use.
A disgruntled cowriter or abusive content claimant would have no
choice but to automatically grant a license. From a policy
perspective, rights holders should be able to enjoy revenue on
digital platforms despite the preferences of a cowriter. Not
allowing one stakeholder to prevent other stakeholders from
spreading their ideas and content, all while generating revenue
for the whole pie, aligns with the utilitarian goals of copyright law
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”210
G. Burden Shifting in Copyright Cases: A Change in Ideology
A recent notable case, Field v. Google,211 highlights courts’
changing expectations of how licenses are issued. In 2004, Field
filed a copyright infringement suit against Google alleging
violation of his reproduction and distribution rights.212 For Google
to be able to provide its search engine service, it crawls the
Internet creating cached versions, or “snapshots,” of websites to
better enable indexing of results.213 Google provides cached
versions of webpages in its search results as well.214 Field alleged
that Google’s copying and distribution of his website in the form of
cached pages constituted infringement.215 The court granted
Google’s motion for summary judgment216 and ruled that Google
had an “implied license” to make the reproductions and
distributions of Field’s webpage because Field did not attach the
208 See Patrick McKay, YouTube Copyfraud & Abuse of the Content ID System,
FAIR USE TUBE.ORG (Nov. 23, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://fairusetube.org/youtube-copyfraud
[http://perma.cc/22KE-LVFT].
209 Currently, millions of dollars in accumulated revenue is tied up in escrow
because of this issue. Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
210 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8.
211 Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
212 Id. at 1109-10.
213 Id. at 1110.
214 Id. at 1111 (“Google has provided ‘Cached’ links with its search results
since 1998.”).
215 Id. at 1114.
216 Id.
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appropriate metatags to his website to prevent it from being
cached.217 In other words, because Field did not take the
appropriate steps to prevent third parties from caching his site,
his inaction granted Google an implied license.
Field is noteworthy in that it shifts the burden to
copyright owners to “opt out” of a default licensing system instead
of traditionally “opting in” to a specific use. The onus is on rights
holders to prevent or veto uses of content, not on users to ask for
permission, reflecting modern views as to how copyrighted
material on Internet platforms should be managed. The
compulsory system evinces similar attitudes and seeks to achieve
the same end—it presumes that a work is available for use
without prior approval or permission. Field shows that as a
society, we are ideologically and doctrinally closer to embracing
and achieving a compulsory license system. Field signals a
paradigm shift for licensure of copyrighted web content from
express to implied licensing, bringing us closer to a compulsory
licensing regime by moving the needle along the continuum
towards less restrictive licensing practices.218
IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH IMPLEMENTATION
A. Establishing Uniformity Across Platforms
Establishing uniformity across platforms is one of the
biggest hurdles to implementing a compulsory synchronization
license. Requiring UGC services to participate in issuing these
licenses on-platform seems technologically and logistically
impossible because it requires UGC services to be technically
sophisticated enough to handle a Content ID–type system. This
may have a crippling effect on innovation by creating a higher
barrier to entry for any platform that hosts user-generated
content. One solution may be that the compulsory system merely
sets certain minimum standards, even if the system is not as
sophisticated as Content ID.219 Perhaps one could envision a
217 Id. at 1115-16.
218 An example of a more restrictive licensing practice would be one that requires
arms-length negotiation and express authorization, whereas examples of less restrictive
licensing practices include implied licenses, creative commons licenses, and compulsory
licenses (i.e., those that do not require permission or negotiation with the rights holder).
219 Think of a system somewhat akin to the European Union Data Privacy
Directive, which set minimum standards for data privacy compliance for all E.U. member
nations. See Press Release, Directorate of Communications, Council of Europe, Council of
Europe Adopts Recommendation of Profiling and Data Protection (Nov. 25, 2010),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=PR892(2010)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Si
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system where a third-party licensing body, akin to ASCAP, would
issue and administer these licenses by connecting to and
communicating with UGC platforms to enable that support. A
positive point to note is that Content ID–like systems are
becoming increasingly common across UGC platforms,220 perhaps
signifying that implementing this technology is quite feasible.
Another potential roadblock to implementation is that a
compulsory license system may impliedly or directly create a
duty for UGC platforms to scan for infringement through the
use of audio-recognition technology. Currently, there is no duty
for UGC platforms to search for copyright infringement.221 On
the other hand, Google CEO Eric Schmidt has regarded
Content ID as “key” for avoiding infringement liability.222 But
UGC platforms should find solace in the fact that a compulsory
system would effectively eliminate the specter of liability for
copyright infringement, because all uses that qualify would be
licensed by default.
B. The Money Train Isn’t Long Enough
The looming question in this new compulsory sync
licensing system is: “Who pays?” In the current compulsory
license system, the licensee pays the licensor.223 On Content ID,
YouTube arranges for the licensor to be paid with ad revenue.224 A
new compulsory sync license may require the licensee, the
intermediary, or both to pay—or perhaps there could be a choice
as to who pays based on the platform.
If advertisers continue to foot the majority of the bill when
it comes to paying copyright holders, this may levy an
unsustainable strain on the revenue pool. Advertisers only have
so much money they can use to fill inventory,225 and perhaps it is
not possible to monetize all content. It is concerning to think that
the system would fail if advertisers stopped bringing huge bags of
money to the table. Do we want a licensing scheme that is
te=COE&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9
BACE [http://perma.cc/YZN3-7PVV].
220 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23.
221 See, e.g., Masnick, supra note 29.
222 Delaney, supra note 73.
223 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
224 Interview with Brandon Martinez, supra note 23; YouTube Partner
Earnings Overview, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72902?hl=en
[http://perma.cc/K3XY-5TDL] (last visited June 6, 2016).
225 Remember that monetized and claimed videos become inventory for advertisers
to fill. See supra Section I.A. Thus, references to inventory here merely mean claimed and
monetized videos that are waiting to be filled with ads.
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dependent solely upon the viability of the advertising industry?
And even if this were possible, do we want a scheme where
royalty rates are set by ad networks?
As long as content is free, perhaps the answer to these
questions is “yes.” That answer, however, comes with some
qualifications. A system that utilizes ad networks to set royalty
rates would possess inherent inequities because it would depend
upon the advertisers’ interests. Advertisers want to fill inventory
that, among other factors, corresponds with the demographic they
are trying to reach. This means two separate pieces of content
that are similar in terms of quality, views, and engagement could
be treated differently. One piece of content could be filled with
lower-rate ads while another, similar piece of content could be
filled with higher-rate ads, resulting in more royalties to the
latter content owner. Thus, it seems unfair to pay a copyright
holder a royalty equal to its relative value to advertisers, rather
than the value it contributes to YouTube and society overall.
Another revenue consideration is that if the royalty rate
depends on the ad networks, which fluctuate constantly, this
could result in devaluation of copyrighted content. Currently,
there are statutorily prescribed, minimum royalty rates in place
for content licensed via section 115.226 A compulsory sync license
dependent solely on ad revenue may result in market forces
pushing the price of content down (via simple supply and demand
economics) because the amount of digital content available is
virtually endless. One possible solution would be to set a statutory
minimum for content, and advertisers would have the option of
paying more than the minimum for premium content.
Implementing a statutory minimum is a risky situation, however.
If the minimum is too high, it could drive disgruntled advertisers
off-platform. If the minimum is too low, copyrighted content may
be devalued anyway because setting a low floor reflects that
content is worth less.
Perhaps a compulsory sync license system that gives users
the option and ability to foot some of the bill for licensing the
content would be beneficial as well. Knowing that they have a
direct impact on the artist’s bottom line might bring users closer
to artists and copyright holders. Any user payment would also be
factored into increasing the value that ad networks attribute to
specific pieces of content, thus resulting in higher-grossing ad
placements. All in all, though taking money from advertisers may
be problematic, as long as consumers are not willing to pay for
226 What Are Mechanical Royalty Rates?, supra note 142.
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content, advertiser dollars are here to stay and would be the
prevailing source of revenue in a compulsory synchronization
licensing scheme.
C. Who Administers? Private Industry or the Government?
A concern of rights holders under a compulsory sync
system is: Who administers and distributes the royalties?
Different conflicts of interest would exist depending on whether a
private body (i.e., UGC platforms) or the government administers
this system and distributes royalties. The question truly boils
down to whether licensing should be done on-platform (by a UGC
platform like YouTube) or via a neutral third party (like the
government). There are arguments for and against both. Private
corporations may argue that they should not be saddled with
taking on a statutory licensing scheme enacted by the people
because that is the government’s duty. Another concern is that
on-platform licensing involves an inherent conflict of interest. On
one hand, platforms desire to maximize revenue for their
administration services. On the other hand, platforms should
ensure that the value enjoyed by rights holders is maximized by
cheapening administration services. Although transaction costs
would decrease if licenses were issued on-platform, the inherent
conflict of interest and burden placed on UGC platforms could
weigh against having a private corporation administer a special
compulsory synchronization license.
Perhaps governmental regulation and oversight of private
corporations would ensure that rights holders are paid fairly and
that the system is managed properly. Again, corporations will
most likely fight against the government imposing any sort of
duty. Moreover, licensing could be conducted by a neutral,
statutorily created body that connects and communicates with
various UGC platforms’ technology to record data on all claims
and views, similar to the services SoundExchange provides for
noninteractive streaming platforms.227
D. What About the DMCA Takedown?
A compulsory sync license regime would necessarily
displace provisions of the DMCA as they apply to infringement of
227 SoundExchange collects noninteractive streaming royalties for the use of
sound recordings. About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/
[http://perma.cc/KK5B-7W7G] (last visited June 6, 2016).
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the reproduction, distribution, and synchronization rights on
UGC platforms. It would mean that content owners could not
submit a takedown notice for these uses on UGC platforms. The
protections of the DMCA in this context, however, would not have
to be completely abolished. Perhaps an amendment to the DMCA
would condense the scope of takedowns on UGC platforms so that
takedowns are only available where there is objectively offensive
material paired with a copyright owner’s specific composition or
recording. Although it would be difficult to draw the line as to
what constitutes “objectively offensive,” a start would be banning
porn/obscenity and building up from there.228 Moreover, it would
be prudent not to strip all the protections that the DMCA
currently affords to rights holders, because in a compulsory
system, rights holders already have little control over their
content.229 Thus, in the interest of fairness, content owners should
not lose complete control over certain rights that they once fully
possessed. In sum, the DMCA would potentially serve as a
statutory outer boundary that curtails the expansion of a
compulsory rights system.
E. Scope of the License
The scope of a compulsory sync license would be difficult to
define. It must be drawn narrowly and with great caution so as
not to disrupt licensing practices in other sectors of the music
industry. For starters, the present day system prescribes natural,
logical bounds, as one of the main reasons for implementation is
that there is already a de facto system in place. Next, the policy
motivations behind the compulsory regime are instrumental to
defining the scope of the license. In theory, this license is meant to
benefit the “little guy,” such as people like your cousin merely
trying to post her wedding video. It is also meant to alleviate the
challenges faced by content owners that necessarily arise in
licensing vast amounts of content. Bearing these goals in mind, a
compulsory sync license must be drafted to achieve, but not
exceed, these ends.
To be clear, the license would only cover the use of sound
recordings and musical compositions for synchronization with an
original visual representation for use on UGC platforms. And the
228 Although admittedly, most UGC platforms would, in their terms of
service/terms of use agreements, expressly prohibit porn or obscenity.
229 Bevilacqua, supra note 157, at 299 (“Compulsory licenses create a
mandatory non-negotiable contract where the property owner is forced to give virtually
unlimited use of his work . . . .”).
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law’s definitions are imperative to determining the scope of the
license. What is classified as a UGC platform would be any
platform akin to YouTube, Facebook, Snapchat, Vine, Instagram,
Vimeo, or Daily Motion, which all allow individual, amateur users
to sign up for accounts to upload video content. Use on any other
platform, such as Cable TV, Netflix, HBO, or any other video site
that does not have user-generated content would not qualify for
the license.230 Curated video sites like Vevo would also not qualify
because Vevo does not maintain user-generated content—it is a
music video distributor.231 The traditional method of obtaining a
synchronization license, via arms-length negotiation, would still
be available in all other instances.
Further, it is equally important to limit the types of users
permitted to invoke the license. The scope must initially be
limited to amateurs. Corporations with large artist rosters (who
have already negotiated ancillary royalty agreements with
YouTube)232 should not be able to take advantage of what may
perhaps be a more economically favorable arrangement under the
compulsory license. Small and medium-sized record labels and
music publishers should not be able to take advantage of the
compulsory license unless the entity is so small that it would be
cost prohibitive to obtain a traditional license.233 And large
multichannel networks such as Fullscreen or Maker Studios234
that gross millions of dollars a year from syndication of content235
are obviously not within the scope of the license.
230 If the platform has user tiers and syndicated tiers, the license would apply
only to user-uploaded content.
231 Catherine Shu, YouTube Confirms Renewed VEVO Deal, Takes Stake in
Company, TECHCRUNCH (July 2, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/02/youtube-
renewed-vevo-deal/ [http://perma.cc/WR92-JR6G].
232 Most major content owners have opted in to YouTube, like it or not. McIntyre,
supra note 194 (“Vice President and Global Head of Business at YouTube Robert Kyncl
recently claimed that they already had deals with 90% of the industry . . . .”).
233 The entity would have a duty to show that it could not afford a traditional
synchronization license for online syndication.
234 See FULLSCREEN, http://www.fullscreen.com/ [http://perma.cc/6MCK-CLCZ]
(last visited June 6, 2016); MAKER STUDIOS, http://www.makerstudios.com/ [http://perma.cc/
9A5T-NNZ9] (last visited June 6, 2016); see also Carla Marshall, Beyond YouTube: Why
MCNs are Looking to Other Video Platforms for New Opportunities, REELSEO (Aug. 13,
2015), http://www.reelseo.com/beyond-youtube-multichannel-networks/ [http://perma.cc/
4YSG-4B2R] (showing that Maker Studios and Fullscreen were the top two multichannel
networks on YouTube in June 2015, ranked by total views).
235 Wagner James Au, YouTube’s Machinima Channel Earning Up to $8.6M a
Year!, NEW WORLD NOTES (Oct. 4, 2011), http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2011/10/youtube-
machinima-channel-revenue.html [http://perma.cc/7HBU-B5Y9].
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CONCLUSION
The establishment of a special compulsory synchronization
license for UGC platforms that host musical compositions and
sound recordings is crucial to creating a uniform standard for
content management across the web. Currently, there is no
consistency in enforcing and monetizing copyright on the
Internet. YouTube is the leading innovator in evolving licensing
schemes, and it makes sense to follow its system and attempt to
implement a similar system on other UGC platforms. Statutory
implementation of a special compulsory synchronization license
will encourage other UGC platforms to provide an infrastructure
that does not thrive on widespread ratification of infringement. In
the process, this system will alleviate the chilling of content,
inadequate compensation, bias in adjudicating user disputes, and
licensing’s high transaction costs. All in all, artists, songwriters,
and users alike should be fairly compensated for their creations,
and this system brings us one step closer to realizing that goal.
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